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1“Voter Identification Requirements | Voter ID Laws,” last modified October 6, 2015, http://www.
ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx2Ibid. 3“Texas NAACP v. Steen,” last modified August 5, 2015, https://www.brennancenter.org/
legal-work/naacp-v-steen4Ibid. 5Ibid.
6.Ibid.7“Study Finds Strong Evidence for Discriminatory Intent Behind Voter ID Laws,” last 
modified June 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/03/
study-finds-strong-evidence-for-discriminatory-intent-behind-voter-id-laws/8 “Fighting Voter ID Requirements,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed October 15, 2015, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/fighting-voter-suppression/fighting-voter-id-require-
ments
By Aleksandra Boots
CAS ’17
Voter Identification Laws 
The Battle Over
in the United States
Sources
Voter identification laws have become controversial in American politics. As of today, a total of thirty-six states have passed laws requiring voters to show some sort of identification when voting.1 First time voters 
will face additional requirements at the polls. However, 
in some states, such as Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Pennsylvania, voter identification laws have been struck 
down.2 The Supreme Court declined to hear Wisconsin’s 
case that its voter identification law is discriminatory. 
However, in Texas, the federal court blocked Texas’s 
voter identification law. While the Courts are upholding 
voter identification laws in many states, they are 
deeming the laws of other states unconstitutional.
On September 17, 2013, the Brennan Center, Lawyers’ 
Committee, and co-counsel filed a suit in federal court 
challenging SB 14, Texas’s strict photo voter identification 
law on behalf of the Texas State Conference of the 
NAACP and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus of 
the Texas House of Representatives.3 In Texas NAACP v. 
Steen (consolidated with Veasey v. Perry), the 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that Texas’s photo ID law violates 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.4 The Courts 
argued that Texas’s photo ID requirement has been one 
of the strictest voter identification requirements in the 
United States.5 The appellate court also argued that 
Texas’s photo ID law violates Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, claiming that the photo ID requirement 
“imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
vote, was passed by the Texas legislature with the intent 
to discriminate, and constitutes an unconstitutional poll 
tax.”6 Texas’s photo voter ID law discriminates against 
minorities, preventing African Americans and Latinos 
from voting in the state of Texas. 
Although the federal court has deemed Texas’s 
photo identification requirement discriminatory, other 
states continue to enforce strict voting requirements. 
Supporters of voter identification laws, especially 
Republican legislatures, believe that these laws will 
significantly reduce voter fraud. Despite such claims, 
a recent study performed by a group of political 
scientists from Stanford and University of Wisconsin 
indicates that “virtually all the major scholarship on 
voter impersonation fraud – based largely on specific 
allegations and criminal investigations – has concluded 
that it is vanishingly rare, and certainly nowhere near the 
numbers necessary to have an effect on any election.”7 
Those who claim that voter fraud is rare also believe 
that the true purpose of the voter identification laws is 
to help Republicans win elections. On the other side of 
the debate, opponents of voter identification laws argue 
that the laws are, in fact, racially discriminatory. The 
American Civil Liberties Union strongly opposes the 
implementation of voter identification laws. According 
to the ACLU, the voter ID requirements make it more 
difficult for African Americans, the elderly, students, and 
people with disabilities to exercise their constitutional 
right to vote.8
The voter identification laws that exist today have 
caused great controversy in American politics. Some 
politicians have already expressed their concerns about 
the fact that stricter laws may be enacted over the 
next few years. Due to the significant impact that voter 
identification laws have had on voter turnout in some 
states, disputes continue to arise between Democrats 
and Republicans. 
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Anybody Want a
Red-Sox Ticket?
By Amrita Sethi
CAS ‘16
1Malegislature.gov,. 2015. ‘General Laws: CHAPTER 140, Section 185D’. https://malegisla-
ture.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXX/Chapter140/Section185D.2Lainer v. City of Boston, 95 F. Supp. 2d 17 - Dist. Court, D. Massachusetts 2000, available at: 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=40729011803512954483Ibid.4Ibid.5Ibid.
6Ibid.7Ibid.8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.11Boston Red Sox,. 2015. ‘Stubhub Seller FAQ’. http://boston.redsox.mlb.com/ticketing/stub-
hub_faq_seller.jsp?c_id=bos.
The big game between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees is tonight, your professor cancels your calculus midterm tomorrow, and the obstacle in your way no longer exists. However, there is another 
barrier to cross before you can witness the Red Sox 
destroy the Yankees. The tickets are all sold out. What 
do you do? Do you go online to StubHub, Seatgeek and 
other such sites? Do you buy them from one of the 
gentlemen in Kenmore Square selling tickets before 
every game? Or, do you sit at home and watch Game 
of Thrones instead? You meet a friend right outside 
Fenway and he says he has an extra ticket he is willing 
to sell you for a price less than the one printed on the 
ticket. As a law student, you question the legality of 
this transaction and wonder if it’s considered scalping. 
Is it still illegal if its not done for a profit? Does it still 
count as a business transaction? Can he be arrested? 
You know that Section 185D states, “No licensee under 
section one hundred and eighty-five A shall resell 
any ticket or other evidence of right of entry to any 
theatrical exhibition, public show or public amusement 
or exhibition of any description at a price in excess of 
two dollars in advance of the price printed on the face 
of such ticket or other evidence of right of entry as the 
purchase price thereof.”1 The state of Massachusetts 
not only requires you to posses a license for the resale 
of tickets, but also implements a price cap. These laws 
apply to everyone either selling them on or off of the 
premises. 
The Lainer v. City memorandum at the United 
States District Court, D. Massachusetts tested these 
rules. In this case, the plaintiff, Gary Lainer, sought 
an injunction and compensation for damages that 
originated when he was arrested for selling a Boston 
Red Sox ticket outside Fenway Park.2 He asserted 
that the Boston Police Department’s arrest policy is 
“contrary to the controlling statute which prohibits 
an unlicensed person from engaging in the business 
of reselling tickets. Arrests under the flawed policy are 
unconstitutional, thus posing the risk of irreparable 
injury.”3 Lainer attached four affidavits from different 
individuals who were in similar situations. The 
defendant, City of Boston, claimed that the BPD is 
justified in arresting anyone that attempts to resell 
their tickets. Furthermore, they said that the damage 
done is not irreparable.4 The plaintiff then countered 
that the risk of injury caused by such an injunction 
outweighs its costs, stating that it seeks nothing more 
than the proper enforcement of the law.5 Lainer claimed 
that he asked, “Anybody need a ticket?” He then sold it 
to the buyer at the face value.6 He argued that this did 
not violate the anti-scalping law, and pointed out that 
the officers in question made no attempt to extract 
this information from him before taking action. Thus, 
he insisted, this should be deemed a wrongful arrest.7 
The defendants responded that the arrest was justified 
under Commonwealth v. Sovrensky, in that it was made 
under the clear view of a “warning sign”8 in order to 
prevent Red Sox fans from being “accosted or impeded 
by scalpers.”9 The court allowed the plaintiff ’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction and urged the officers, and 
all other personnel against arresting people who try 
to resell their Red Sox ticket near Fenway Park unless 
the officers have probable cause to do so. They specify 
that the sale must be made at face value or less, as only 
licensed merchants can resell the ticket at higher than 
face value.10 
Reselling of tickets has always been a gray area. 
The laws differ from state to state and are different 
for various organizations. While it might be legal to 
purchase tickets for a Red-Sox game from StubHub, 
because they are “the official fan to fan Ticket 
Marketplace of Redsox.com,”11the same cannot be said 
for the Patriots. The debate continues on whether or 
not the secondary market should be legalized, and if 
consumers will benefit or suffer from its legalization.
Sources
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By Ana Paula Amatuzzi
CAS ‘18
1 Ed Pilkington, “Doctor involved in botched execution 
‘experimented’ on inmate, suit claims”, last modified 
October 14, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/oct/14/oklahoma-clayton-lockett-execu-
tion-doctor-experiment-oaths-lawsuit
2 Ibid.
3“The Constitution of the United States,” Amendment 8.
4Charles F. Warner, “Petition to the SCORTUS 
Requesting Writ Certiorari” petition, 2015.
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/01/2015.01.13-Cert-Petition.pdf
5Charles F. Warner, “Petition to the SCORTUS 
Requesting Writ Certiorari” petition, 2015.
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/01/2015.01.13-Cert-Petition.pdf
6Kevin J. Gross, “Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ 
Certiorari”, 2015. http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2015-01-14-Brief-in-
Opposition.pdf
7Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech. 
“Glossip v. Gross.” Oyez. https://www.oyez.org/cas-
es/2014/14-7955 (accessed October 19, 2015).
8 Ibid.
Death Penalty
“Less Cruel”In 2014, Oklahoma used an untested mixture of drugs on the execution of Clayton Lockett, convicted in 2000 of murder, rape, 
and kidnapping.1 This untested 
drug caused Lockett to suffer for 
40 minutes before dying, which 
obligated Oklahoma to suspend 
subsequent executions until an 
investigation was concluded. The 
state adopted a new protocol of 
drug combinations; however, the 
new combination still included 
midazolam, the initial drug used 
in Clayton Lockett’s execution. 
The incident not only led Lockett’s 
family to sue the responsible 
doctor, Dr. Johnny Zellmer, 
alleging that he violated the rule 
established at Nuremberg trials,2 
but also sparked the questioning 
of whether or not Oklahoma 
violated the Eighth Amendment, 
which prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment.3
The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
became involved when Charles 
Warner, who raped and murdered 
an eleventh month-old baby, as 
well as other death row inmates, 
opened a petition for a writ of 
certiorari.4  They argued the 
violation of the Eighth Amendment 
by employees of the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections, such 
as Richard Gross.5 Warner and 
the other plaintiffs expected the 
petition to prevent Oklahoma 
from moving forward with their 
executions.6 However, the Supreme 
Court declined to grant the petition 
and sided with the respondents 
who argued that midazolam has 
proved efficient in Florida, and 
that Oklahoma has had difficulty in 
obtaining the necessary chemicals 
to conduct executions. 
Since Warner was executed, 
the case was renamed after one 
of the other plaintiffs, Richard 
Glossip, a man accused of beating 
his employer to death, petitioned 
to court. The opinion for the case 
Glossip vs. Gross was delivered on 
June 29, 2015, by Justice Alito, with 
a 5-4 majority. The Court decided 
that there was not sufficient 
evidence that using midazolam 
as an initial drug causes severe 
pain, and that the drug used in the 
protocol did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court argued 
the Eighth Amendment does not 
require the execution method to be 
free of risk and pain, and since the 
petitioners were unable to present 
a less cruel method, midazolam 
is still the only option known and 
available.  
The Judgement was issued on 
August 28, 2015, after the denial 
of Glossip’s Rehearing Petition, 
closing the tentative of the plaintiffs 
to postpone their death. However, 
it did reopen the debate of whether 
or not the death penalty can be 
changed to avoid unnecessary 
suffering. In court, the concurring 
and dissenting opinions show 
how polemic the cruelty of death 
penalty still is in the United States.6 
Justice Scalia, for example, pointed 
that “the arguments that it is cruel, 
deal with the concerns about 
conviction, not the punishment 
itself,” and Justice Breyer argued 
that “the death penalty is no 
longer constitutional”. It seems the 
disparate opinions about this issue 
will continue to diverge depending 
on whether the rules of ethics 
or the Constitution is used as a 
supporting argument. 
Sources
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By Andy Gorden
CAS ‘18
Grappling With Crisis:
The European Union’s Law Surrounding 
the Refugee crisisThe Europe Union is in the midst of one of the largest influxes of refugees and migrants in its history. In grappling with this crisis, three important features of EU law have come into play: their legal definition of who is a refugee 
versus who is a migrant, their implementation of the Dublin 
Regulation which establishes a hierarchy in granting 
asylum for refugees, and their use of the Schengen Borders 
Code which regulates the crossing of external borders. 
Serving as the legal framework for the EU’s asylum 
policy, the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
Refugees established the standard definitions of who is 
a refugee and who is a migrant. Whereas migrants are 
those who “choose to move in order to improve the future 
prospects of themselves and their families,” refugees by 
contrast “have to move if they are to save their lives and 
protect their freedom.”1 Thus, the interpretations over 
what makes a person a migrant versus a refugee have 
important ramifications as the EU only grants asylum to 
“people fleeing persecution or serious harm in their own 
country,” thereby precluding migrants from getting the 
same protection as refugees.2 
While these two legal terms may seem rather black and 
white, the EU’s Dublin Regulation NO 604/2013 presents 
a problem. The law “establishes the Member State 
responsible for the examination of the asylum application” 
or in other words it forces refugees to apply for asylum in 
the state in which they initially landed.3 The complication 
comes in the disproportionate amount of people landing 
in the less developed EU states such as Italy and Greece.4 
If a refugee, therefore, initially lands in Greece and decides 
that his family would have a better future in Germany, 
all of a sudden his standing under EU law shifts to that 
of a migrant because he is not moving due to fear of 
persecution. This raises the question of whether or not 
the terms “migrant” and “refugee” are mutually exclusive. 
With the amount of people reaching EU territory 
increasing from 280,000 in 2014 to 350,000 in January-
August of 2015 alone,5 one has to wonder if there is an 
infrastructural problem in addition to the definitional one. 
Control of the EU’s border is based upon the Schengen 
Borders Code that establishes “a community code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders.”6 It is worth noting that within this code, there 
is no rule calling for the construction of fences, which 
obviously makes the borders more permeable.
Additionally, even though Schengen requires a valid 
visa, travel documents, and justification for entrance 
into the country among other prerequisites, there is an 
important caveat. Indeed, after listing these rules for 
gaining entrance into an EU country, the code warns, “If 
these conditions are not met, entry into the territory is 
refused, unless special provisions (e.g. for humanitarian 
reasons) apply.”7 Clearly, people who might ordinarily be 
turned away due to insufficient documentation receive 
asylum for said humanitarian reasons. The possibility of 
easier entrance into EU territory, then, may be another 
contributing factor in the spike of migrants and refugees 
seeking asylum. 
As the civil war in Syria rages on, a mitigation of the 
flow of migrants and refugees does not appear to be 
in sight. That said, the EU is currently relying on the 
tripartite approach of strict legal definitions of refugees 
and migrants, the Dublin Regulation, and the Schengen 
Borders Code, to simultaneously decrease the amount of 
people flowing in and keep the dispossessed safe. 
Sources
1UNHCR. “Refugees.” www.unhcr.org. Accessed November 1, 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49c3646c125.html.>
2European Commission. “Common European Asylum System.” ec.europa.eu. Accessed Novem-
ber 1, 2015.
   < http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm.>
3“Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.” Eur-lex.europa.
eu. Accessed November 2, 2015. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;jsession-
id=jHNlTp3HLjqw8mqGbQSpZh1VWpjCyVQq14Hgcztw4pbfSQZffnrn!557467765?uri=CELEX-
:32013R0604>
4Nash Jenkins, “Large Numbers of Refugees Landed on Greek Shores Overnight.” Time.com. 
Last modified September 2, 2015. Accessed October 30, 2015. <http://time.com/4019771/
migrants-refugees-greece-eu/> 
5“Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” www.bbc.com. Last modified September 21, 
2015. Accessed October 30, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>
6“Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.” eur-lex.europa.
eu. Accessed November 2, 2015. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URIS-
ERV:l14514>
7“Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.” eur-lex.europa.
eu. Accessed November 2, 2015. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URIS-
ERV:l14514>
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By Asha Mehrotra
CAS ’17
The Future of Religious Practices in the Workplace
S
amantha Elauf, a then recent 
high school graduate, applied 
for employment at a Tulsa, 
Oklahoma Abercrombie and 
Fitch Kids store in 2008. 
As a Muslim teenager, Elauf wore 
a hijab, a type of headscarf, as a 
practice of her religion.1 According 
to the Abercrombie “Look Policy,” 
their version of a dress code, 
employees were prohibited to wear 
“caps” or “headwear.”2 The Assistant 
Manager, Heather Cooke, interviewed 
Samantha Elauf and consulted the 
district manager, Randall Johnson, 
who concluded that Elauf’s hijab 
violated company policy. Cooke, 
however, informed Johnson that she 
thought Elauf wore the headscarf as 
part of her religious beliefs. Elauf was 
not hired for the job, although the 
rest of her interview and application 
received a high rating that would have 
“qualif[ied] her to be hired.”3
Elauf took her case to the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which 
proceeded to file a lawsuit for her.4 
The EEOC works to prevent any and 
all discrimination against applicants 
and employees.5 The main issue of the 
lawsuit was “whether an employer 
can be liable for discrimination when 
a would-be employee doesn’t give 
explicit notice of a need for religious 
accommodation.”6 This case hinged 
on the Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which makes it illegal 
for employers to not hire someone 
because of his or her religion, 
including religious adherences. 
The EEOC’s argument was based 
on the fact that Elauf should not 
have been completely responsible 
for requesting the employer take 
her religious beliefs into account. 
The assistant manager interviewing 
Elauf was fully aware that she was 
wearing a hijab in observance of her 
Islamic practices, even though Elauf 
didn’t explicitly state it. Employers 
must be aware of applicant needs, 
but are not supposed to explicitly 
ask about religious practices, as they 
may come off as being racially or 
religiously discriminating.7 If Elauf 
had requested reasonable religious 
accommodations, Abercrombie 
stated that they would have probably 
honored them, but “no such requests 
had been made in this case.”8 The 
store also argued that they weren’t 
discriminating specifically against 
her, due to the fact that the no “caps” 
or “headwear” policy is applicable 
to every employee, no matter what 
religion they may or may not practice. 
The Supreme Court ruled that Title 
VII “doesn’t require the employer to 
be neutral when it comes to religious 
practices.”9 
The case was first heard in the 
Oklahoma district court, which 
ruled in favor of Elauf and the EEOC. 
However, Abercrombie appealed and 
won at the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, which claimed that 
Abercrombie could not be held liable 
without receiving “explicit, verbal 
notice of the religious conflict.” The 
court, with a 3-0 decision, cited four 
other case precedents from circuit 
courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard the 
case of EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch 
Stores Inc. on February 25, 2015 and 
they ruled 8-1 in favor of EEOC on 
June 1, 2015.10 Justice Antonin Scalia 
stated, “An employer may not make 
an applicant’s religious practice, 
confirmed or otherwise, a factor in 
employment decisions.”11 According 
to the Court, the Tenth Circuit 
incorrectly interpreted Title VII in 
making its decision. The only justice 
who voted in favor of Abercrombie 
was Justice Clarence Thomas, who 
was also previously the chairman 
of the EEOC. He reasoned that 
Abercrombie and Fitch could only be 
“held liable for failing to hire Elauf 
only in it intentionally discriminated 
against her.”12
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
not only affects Samantha Elauf, but 
it also changes the way religion and 
religious practices are handled in the 
workplace. Employers will need to 
find the fine line between attempting 
to accommodate “unvoiced 
religious preferences” and religious 
discrimination.13 
1“Victory for religious rights in the workplace: In Plain En-
glish,” SCOTUSblog, last modified June 2, 2015, http://www.
scotusblog.com/2015/06/victory-for-religious-rights-in-the-
workplace-in-plain-english/.
2“Court to consider accommodations for religiously devout 
employees: In Plain English,” SCOTUSblog, last modified 
February 24, 2015, http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/
court-to-consider-accommodations-for-religiously-de-
vout-employees-in-plain-english/.
3Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie 
&Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. (2015).
4“Victory.” 
5“Overview,” US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/. 
6“Abercrombie’s refusal to hire teen with hijab to be reviewed 
by SCOTUS,” ABA Journal, last modified October 3, 2014, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abercrombies_re-
fusal_to_hire_teen_with_hijab_to_be_reviewed_by_scotus.
7“Court to consider.” 
8“Appeals court rules for Abercrombie in headscarf case,” 
ABA Journal, last modified October 4, 2015,http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/appeals_court_sides_with_aber-
crombie_in_headscarf_case.
9“Victory.” 
10Mark Walsh, “Supreme Court’s Abercrombie ruling marks 
a setback for employers,” ABA Journal (2015), accessed 
October 16, 2015, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/supreme_courts_abercrombie_ruling_marks_a_set-
back_for_employers.
11Ibid. 
12“Victory.” 
13Mark Walsh. 
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Native American Women
New Legislation Protects
By Bidemi Palmer 
Questrom ‘18Under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2013, non-Native Americans can now be tried by tribal courts for 
crimes taking place on the reservation 
and involving domestic violence, dating 
violence and criminal violations of 
protection orders. The provision under 
Title XI went into effect on March 7, 
2015, two years after its proposal 
in 2013, making it the first major 
legislation designed to protect Native 
American women from violence and 
assault.1
For many years, Native Americans 
were subject to double standards 
pertaining to U.S. jurisdiction. Natives 
who were both tribal and United States 
citizens were culpable for crimes 
outside of the reservation. Moreover, 
these Natives were not subject to 
court or trial within their reservation, 
but instead in a U.S. court where they 
were many times unfamiliar with the 
system.2 Unsure of the VAWA’s potential 
outcomes, Congress rolled out a pilot 
study. The Confederated Tribes of 
the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, and the Tulalip 
Tribes all participated in the pilot 
project that launched in 2014.3 The 
program was authorized by VAWA and 
allowed for the new jurisdiction to be 
established specifically in those tribes 
after approval. As of May 2015, the 
three tribes collectively charged 26 
defenders.3
Not only is violence against women 
extremely common, it is usually 
concealed, especially among Native 
American women. Where as one in 
five women across all races report 
having been raped in their lifetime in 
the United States, three in five Native 
women report having been raped.3 
Thus, Native Americans are 2.5 times 
more likely to encounter sexual assaults 
than all other ethnic groups.4 However, 
often times, victims do not report 
rape, therefore, rates are suspected 
to be higher. Despite the statistics, 
tribal women were not sufficiently 
protected by the law, considering the 
limited power Natives had in their 
reservations.5 In 1978, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Native policeman 
could not arrest non-Native men on 
reservations in the case Oliphant vs. 
Suquamish.6
The provision only applies to crimes 
that take place within reservation 
boundaries and occur between non-
native and native person(s). Also, the 
accused person(s) must have sufficient 
ties to the tribe, such as working on or 
living in the reservation.1 In regards to 
funding, Congress granted $25 million 
in tribal grants for the years between 
2014 and 2018.1 Although Congress 
has not distributed the money as of 
May 2015, tribes are able to apply for 
funding.
There has been opposition and doubt 
concerning the effectiveness of the 
act. Mahnomen Native, Lisa Brunner’s 
daughter, was raped by 4 men outside 
of her reservation.7 However, the men 
were not tried because the event took 
place outside the reservation and 
the men involved had no ties to the 
reservation. Other loopholes remain, 
as the act does not cover all possible 
situations. Also, by relying on federal 
or state authorities, it can take a person 
many days to travel to the nearest 
prosecutor or examiner given the size 
of many reservations. The act also fails 
to expand tribal jurisdiction; currently 
tribes are limited to sentencing up to 
three years for even the most serious 
crimes.7 Many argue that the needs 
of Native women who are raped or 
experience domestic violence are not 
met by VAWA in its present form. The 
act’s current margin is very narrow, as 
it primarily focuses solely on dating 
violence and targeting domestic 
violence. 
In the past, Republicans expressed 
strong disapproval for the bill, 
deeming it unconstitutional.3 Others 
see it as a beacon for positive change 
for marginalized Natives. Although 
the provision is in its infancy, it is 
a significant stride for the Native 
population and human rights in the 
United States. It is possible that, in 
the future, the act could be amended. 
For now, however, it is the first of its 
kind and can pave the way for more 
protection for Native Americans and 
other under representative minorities 
living in the United States.
from
Sources
1”Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Reauthorization 2013.” 
The United States Department of Justice. March 26, 2015. 
Accessed October 15, 2015. 1. http://www.justice.gov/tribal/
violence-against-women-act-vawa-reauthorization-2013-0.
2Crane-Murdoch, Sierra. “On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get 
Away With Almost Anything.” The Atlantic. February 22, 2013. 
Accessed November 1, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-
away-with-almost-anything/273391/.
3Bendery, Jennifer. “At Last, Violence Against Women Act Lets 
Tribes Prosecute Non-Native Domestic Abusers.” The Huffington 
Post. March 6, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/06/vawa-native-ameri-
cans_n_6819526.html.
4”Tribal Communities.” The United States Department of Justice. 
September 17, 2015. Accessed November 2, 2015. http://www.
justice.gov/ovw/tribal-communities#1.
5”American Indian Law.” LII / Legal Information Institute. 
Accessed November 2, 2015. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
American_Indian_law.
6”687. Tribal Court Jurisdiction.” The United States Department 
of Justice. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://www.justice.gov/
usam/criminal-resource-manual-687-tribal-court-jurisdiction.
7Reilly, Mollie. “Violence Against Women Act Includes New 
Protections For Native American Women.” The Huffington Post. 
March 10, 2013. Accessed October 24, 2015. http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/2013/03/10/violence-against-women-act-na-
tive-americans_n_2849931.html.
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There is a phrase commonly used by authority figures, whether they be parents or police officers, which states that “ignorance of the law is no excuse for the violation of the law.” This expression is almost a direct 
translation of the Roman law “ignorantia juris non 
excusat.”1
As simple as this may seem, a case involving the 
other side of the law, the enforcer, made its way to the 
Supreme Court in the winter of 2014. The question 
before the court was whether or not an officer’s 
ignorance of the law was reason enough to excuse 
an arrest and seizure of illicit drugs that violated the 
Fourth Amendment.
This case, Heien v. North Carolina, arose in 2013 
from a traffic stop in North Carolina. A police officer, 
seeing a broken taillight, pulled the car over to issue 
a warning ticket for the brake light. After the officer 
deemed the car’s occupants “suspicious,” he asked 
if he could search the vehicle. Heien consented and 
the officer discovered a bag of cocaine. After this 
incident, Heien went to court and attempted to have 
the results of the search suppressed because state law 
requires only one working brake light, which the car 
in question had.2 After being denied by the trial court, 
he appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
and his decision was reversed. They concluded that 
the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because 
“an officer’s mistaken belief that a defendant has 
committed a traffic violation is not an objectively 
reasonable justification for a traffic stop.”3 
The Court of Appeals then held that evidence 
from the search had to be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule, meaning that any evidence collected 
while violating the defendant’s’ rights is unable to be 
used against him in court. Heien argued that, because 
he was not breaking any law, there was no reasonable 
or individual suspicion that warranted being pulled 
over. Thus, he argued, his rights were violated and the 
evidence had been seized illegally. The United States 
Supreme Court, however, disagreed.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, affirming 
the 8-1 opinion, stated, “Because [the officer’s] mistake 
of law was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion 
justifying the stop under the Fourth Amendment.”4 
He continued, “The Fourth Amendment requires 
government officials to act reasonably, not perfectly,”5 
and referenced a previous case in which the court 
held that the Fourth Amendment gave governmental 
officials “fair leeway for enforcing the law.”6 Chief 
Justice Roberts and seven other justices, with Justice 
Sotomayor dissenting, ruled that as long as an officer 
makes a reasonable mistake, he is within his rights to 
stop anyone for perceived slights of the law. As Orin 
Kerr at The Washington Post opines, “If the Fourth 
Amendment incorporates reasonable mistakes of 
law, then there must be a standard for how much 
law a reasonable officer knows.”7 This decision calls 
to question the standard to which legislative bodies 
hold officers regarding the knowledge they should 
reasonably be expected to possess. 
Suspicion
1Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., West Publishing, 1979, p. 672
2Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. (2014).
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176. (1949)
7Orin Kerr, “Reasonable mistake of law can generate reasonable suspicion, Supreme 
Court holds.” Washington Post, December 15, 2014, accessed November 1, 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/15/reasonable-mis-
take-of-law-can-generate-reasonable-suspicion-supreme-court-holds/. 
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The NCAA:
The Unavoidable Monopoly (Stage) forIn recent times, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has been subject of controversy. One overarching idea is whether athletes —specifically Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) level athletes— should be paid or not. According to ESPN, 
all 125 FBS institutions1 earned combined revenue of 
$3.4 Billion in 2014 through universities’ broadcasting 
deals, ticket sales, and merchandise sales.2 However, the 
best return for revenue generated by these athletes are 
full tuition scholarships, meal plans and special benefits, 
which equate to at most $68,000 a year which may be 
deemed minimal in comparison to the institutions’ 
revenue. 3 While university coaches control their daily 
lives to ensure maximum profit, these athletes are not paid 
for their commitment.4 
One question to ask is what has allowed an atmosphere 
in which big-time NCAA FBS programs generate millions 
of dollars annually in revenue, while their star athletes 
never receive any of the money generated. Furthermore, 
why would any future National Football League (NFL) 
player agree to play in the NCAA even though the average 
NFL salary was $1.9 million in 2013,5 which is $1,832,000 
more than the value he receives at the FBS level?
Universities operate based on the idea that their 
athletes are students before they are athletes. In fact, 
Northwestern University believes athletic programs 
increase the overall college experience of their student 
athletes.6 In fact, Northwestern University’s mindset is 
universally agreed upon throughout the NCAA.
Aspiring NFL players agree to play in the NCAA for 
multiple reasons, one being they must wait at least 
three years after graduating from high school in order 
to be “eligible for the NFL.”7 Furthermore, if they do not 
play in the FBS — the second best football league in The 
United States after the NFL— they most likely will never 
get drafted into the NFL. The necessity of FBS football for 
aspiring professional football players presents the idea 
that the NCAA is set up as an unavoidable monopoly. All 
NCAA institutions have banded together to further benefit 
themselves, while student athletes have minimal say and 
virtually no compensation. The NCAA clearly violates the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.8 Being a “student-athlete” 
is a necessity for any aspiring NFL player, and therefore 
there is no reliable way around the FBS. Even though 
student athletes have tried to improve their conditions, 
their failure is most notable in the attempt at unionization 
by Northwestern University football players in 2015.9 
Thus it becomes evident that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
of 1890 fails to protect FBS athletes.
1Farrey, Tom. “Northwestern Players Denied Request to Form First Union for Athletes.” ESPN. 
August 17, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015.
2Levinson, Mason. “Northwestern Football Players Cannot Form Union, NLRB Rules.” Bloomberg.
com. August 17, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015.
3“Northwestern Undergraduate Admissions Tuition and Aid.” Northwestern University. Accessed 
October 15, 2015.
4Farrey, Tom
5Manfred, Tony. “Two Charts That Expose How Badly NFL Players Get Paid.” Business Insider. 
September 5, 2013. Accessed October 15, 2015.
6Levinson, Mason
7“NFL Draft Rules.” Draftsite.com. Accessed October 15, 2015.
8“The Antitrust Laws.” Federal Trade Commission. Accessed October 15, 2015.
9Farrey, Tom
Aspiring NFL Players
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Killing forOn July 1st of 2015, a thirteen-year-old male Southwest African lion named Cecil was lured out of Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe 
and shot by 55-year-old Minnesotan 
dentist and big game hunting enthusiast 
Walter Palmer. With $50,000 Palmer 
and his hired team were “permitted” 
to lure, track, shoot, put down, skin, 
and finally decapitate Cecil. In all, the 
private hunt lasted over 40 hours, but 
the public outcry persisted for weeks. 
The incident reopened an old wound: 
the wildly controversial practice of 
trophy hunting. The story of Cecil the 
Lion has called into question once again 
the regulations of big game hunting 
in Zimbabwe and has set into motion 
proposals for amendments to U.S. laws 
in the hopes that animals like Cecil will 
not be maimed for sport and decor in 
the future. 
Trophy hunting is the legal practice 
of hunting wild animals, typically big 
game animals, with the intent of turning 
their body parts like their heads, hides, 
and legs into taxidermy trophies.1 The 
practice enters into poaching territory 
when wild animals are killed illegally, 
such as in the case of Cecil.2 According 
to the entrusted Zimbabwe Parks 
and Wildlife Management Authority, 
and Safari Operators Association of 
Zimbabwe, Cecil’s killing was deemed 
illegal because the landowner “was not 
allocated a lion on his hunting quota for 
2015.”3 
The central statute that protects 
wildlife like Cecil in Zimbabwe is the 
Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975. In part, 
the law establishes sanctuaries, national 
parks, and safari areas.4 Additionally, 
the act determines which animals are 
“specially protected” and does not 
include lions in this classification.5 
Even though the act does not protect 
lions, geographically restrictive 
permits do to an extent. The Parks 
and Wildlife (General) Regulations (SI 
362 of 1990) controls the rules and 
forms for wildlife permits.6 Under the 
Regulations, it is illegal to hunt wildlife 
in national parks. Moreover, in 1999, 
the Regulations restricted the use of 
bow and arrow to include “alienated 
land” and prohibited crossbows.7 In the 
case of Cecil, he was lured out of a park, 
shot with a crossbow, and then shot to 
death with a rifle 40 hours later. These 
details make justice for his demise a 
complicated legal battle. 
Cecil’s death sparked activist 
concern for a ban on trophy hunting 
of big game animals such as lions, 
elephants, and rhinos. There is an online 
petition with over a million supporters 
demanding the President of Zimbabwe, 
Robert Mugabe, seek “justice” for Cecil 
by discontinuing the issuing of hunting 
permits to kill endangered animals.8 
Activists hope this will protect the 
population of wild African lions, 
which has declined from an estimated 
200,000 to approximately 30,000 in 
the past century.9 In Zimbabwe, the 
lion population is roughly between 
1,000 and 1,700.10 Unfortunately, South 
Africa’s big game hunting industry 
earns over $744 million,11 which makes 
banning hunting permits less alluring. 
Zimbabwe alone grosses $20 million 
in U.S. currency from trophy hunting 
licenses.12 Furthermore, lions are the 
most lucrative prey because each lion 
hunting permit costs anywhere from 
$25,000 to $70,000.13   
Advocates of regulated hunting, 
such as US Fish and Wildlife Service—
which issues import permits—and the 
World Wildlife Fund argue the revenue 
from trophy hunting provides funding 
for the conservation of endangered 
species.14 Moreover, proponents claim 
that hunting helps maintain the natural 
balance—it enables the Darwinian idea 
of “survival of the fittest.”15 
The story of Cecil the Lion is a 
recent, high profile example of what 
has occurred for many years. Trophy 
hunting and poaching are not new 
policy issues. However, this event has 
brought these concerns back to the 
forefront of the U.S. policy agenda. 
Following Cecil’s death, on August 3rd, 
New Jersey senator Bob Menendez 
introduced an act to disincentivize 
trophy killings called The Conserving 
Ecosystems by Ceasing the Importation 
of Large (CECIL) Animal Trophies 
Act.16 Similarly, the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service proposed listing lions 
as threatened under the Endangered 
Species Act.17 Although these acts have 
not been signed into law yet, they still 
serve, as does Cecil, to illustrate the 
growing need for wildlife regulation 
and the rising interest in trophy 
hunting legislation reform.  
Sport
1Avianne Tan, “Beyond Cecil the Lion: Trophy-Hunting Industry 
in Africa Explained,” ABC News, July 31, 2015, accessed October 
20, 2015. 2Daniel Costa-Roberts, “Why Did Cecil the Lion Die? What You 
Should Know About Trophy Hunting,” PBS, August 1, 2015, 
accessed October 19, 2015. 3Jenthro Mullen and Don Melvin, “Two Zimbabweans Freed on 
Bail in Death of Cecil the Lion,” CNN, July 29, 2009, accessed 
October 20, 2015.4“Parks and Wildlife Act,” FAOLEX, 20:14, accessed October 19, 
2015, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zim8942.pdf. 5Ibid.
6Hanibal Goitom, “FALQs: Laws Related to Hunting Lions in 
Zimbabwe,” Library of Congress, August 4, 2015, accessed October 
20, 2015. 7Goitom, “FALQs: Laws Related to Hunting Lions in Zimbabwe.”8Mullen and Melvin,“Two Zimbabweans Freed on Bail in Death of 
Cecil the Lion.” 
9Brian Clark Howard, “Cecil is One of Hundreds of Lions Killed 
Recently in Zimbabwe,” National Geographic. July 31, 2015, 
accessed October 20, 2015. 
10Goitom, “FALQs: Laws Related to Hunting Lions in Zimbabwe.” 11Lindsey Bever, “The Death of Cecil the Lion and the Big Busi-
ness of Big Game Trophy Hunting,” The Washington Post, July 29, 
2015, accessed October 19, 2015. 12Goitom, “FALQs: Laws Related to Hunting Lions in Zimbabwe.” 13Ibid.14Bever, “The Death of Cecil the Lion and the Big Business of Big 
Game Trophy Hunting.” 15Ibid.
16Mahita Gajanan, “Cecil the Lion’s Death Calls to Ban Trophy 
Hunt Imports to US,” The Guardian, 28 July 28, 2015, accessed 
October 20, 2015. 17Gajanan, “Cecil the Lion’s Death Calls to Ban Trophy Hunt 
Imports to US.” 
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A
s has been stated throughout the media time 
and time again, compared to the rest of the 
world, the United States has the largest prison 
population. It is clear that the United States’ 
criminal-justice system has been in dire straits, 
but when it comes to national conversations about budgets, 
incarceration is rarely considered. Thus, any possibility of 
ample changes is rarely proposed. As U.S. prison populations 
and recidivism rates continue to climb to an unprecedented 
high, the legitimacy of incarceration is being called into 
question. 
Currently, the overcrowding of prisons is placing a heavy 
burden on the infrastructure of the federal prison system. 
Throughout the country, the normative conception of “paying 
time for committing crime” is slowly deteriorating into that 
of distrust and even resentment. However, as of October 1st, in a major step forward, a bipartisan congressional 
push to reform the criminal-justice system by way of 
Senate legislation will essentially reduce the long criticized 
mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders.
The introduction of the Sentencing Reform and 
Corrections Act was pushed chiefly by two senatorial 
newcomers from opposite sides of the political spectrum: 
Senator Cory Booker, D-N.J. along with Senator Mike Lee, 
R-Utah. A work-in-progress since this spring, after months 
of intense negotiations, lawmakers were ultimately able 
to convince skeptical leaders in both parties to back their 
cause. The key to advancing the legislation was winning 
the endorsement of Senate Judiciary Chairman Charles E. 
Grassley. Senator Grassley has long held reservations again 
reducing minimum sentencing.1 However, Senator Booker 
and Senator Lee were able to convince Mr. Grassley and other 
Senators to agree to a package aimed at making the criminal-
justice system impartial, particularly for minorities. 
This bill’s provisions entail significant concessions for 
both Democrats and Republicans. More specifically, the bill 
would significantly reduce federal mandatory minimum 
sentences for nonviolent, repeat drug offenders, enhance 
prisoner rehabilitation programs and largely ban solitary 
confinement of juveniles.2 The bill would also give judges 
more discretion to override a mandatory minimum. That 
said, to some Democrats the sentencing reforms did not 
go as far as they had hoped as the bill would create more 
categories of crimes that come with a mandatory minimum. 
They did not include a provision for a mens rea –criminal 
intent. Honest citizens could get tripped up by laws they do 
not know they are breaking.3 Unfortunately, there is little the 
little the proposed federal law can do to reduce incarceration 
rates at the state level. According to statistics from the 
Department of Justice, in 2014 alone, just over 200,000 of 
the 1.5 million prisoners were in the federal system; the 
other 1.3 million are held by states.4 
States have long resisted changing their laws despite 
indications that they are disproportionately applied to 
minorities and the poor compared to white, wealthy offenders. 
While state mandatory minimums are likely to be less severe 
than those at the federal level, prosecutors more often than 
not, use them as leverage to negotiate a plea deal. In regards 
to the costs of incarceration the most expensive costs are the 
day-to-day expenses, which by most estimates  are over $74 
billion spent annually by the federal and state governments 
on prisons.5 In support of this, Senator Booker stated “mass 
incarceration has cost taxpayers billions of dollars, drained 
our economy, compromised public safety, hurt our children 
and disproportionately affected communities of color while 
devaluing the very idea of justice in America.” In the interim, 
current imprisonment practices are imposing substantial 
socioeconomic effects on individual inmates. To reiterate, 
mandatory minimums, particularly those surrounding 
drug violations, predominantly affect low-income African 
Americans and Latinos. Minimums came to prominence in 
the 1980s through 1990s during the nation’s tough-on-crime 
phase.6 And although supporters argue that crime dropped 
over that time period, prison populations have exponentially 
increased, and with them the price tag of running facilities.
With many high profile lawmakers getting involved, it is 
only a matter of the time until the bill gets a full Senate vote. 
Moreover, even the White House has gotten involved in the 
negotiations. As White House Spokesman Frank Benenati 
said, “The Administration hopes that Congress will move 
quickly so the President can sign such a bill into law this 
year.”7 While more can be done at the federal level to roll 
back mass incarceration in the United States, this is a strong 
effort with a realistic chance at becoming law.
Overhauling the
Criminal-Justice System
Congress:
1Gabrielle Levy, “Criminal Justice Reform Bill 
Hailed as Bipartisan Breakthrough,” October 1, 
2015, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/sen-
ate-plan-to-ease-sentencing-laws.html?_r=0.
2Mike Sacks, “Senate Plans to Unveil Deal 
on Criminal Justice Reform,” Sept. 30, 2015, 
accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.
nationallawjournal.com/id=1202738639705/
Senate-Plans-to-Unveil-Deal-on-Criminal-Jus-
tice-Reform?mcode=1202615705846&slre-
turn=20150917141024.
3Carl Hulse and Jennifer Steinhauer, “Sen-
tencing Overhaul Proposed in Senate with 
Bipartisan Backing,” October 1, 2015, accessed 
October 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/10/02/us/politics/senate-plan-to-
ease-sentencing-laws.html?_r=1.
4Levy, 2015.
5Tom Silver, “Breaking Out of the Prison 
Cycle,” The Institute of Politics at Harvard 
University, accessed October 14, 2015, http://
www.iop.harvard.edu/breaking-out-pris-
on-cycle.
6Rachael Bade, Daniel Lippman and Sarah 
Wheaton, “Senate strikes compromise on 
criminal justice reform,” September 30, 2014, 
accessed October 11, 2015, http://www.politi-
co.com/story/2015/09/senate-reaches-com-
promise-on-criminal-justice-reform-214278.
7Levy, 2015.
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A
merican food processing giants have 
recently been the subject of many 
inquiries on labor standards and 
workers’ rights, and Tyson Foods is no 
exception. Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo2 
is a class action lawsuit filed by Peg Bouaphakeo 
and others regarding undercompensation for work 
performed and for time spent donning protective 
gear for their jobs. The principal questions that will 
be decided in this case are whether or not Tyson 
Foods is liable for payment to employees during 
the procedure for “donning and doffing” protective 
equipment, and if a class action suit may proceed 
when it contains members that may or may not have 
been injured. The first question is merely a simple 
issue of defining labor law. The principal argument 
that arises out of this is whether an employer, such 
as Tyson Foods, is financially liable for the time on 
an employee while donning and doffing protective 
clothing and equipment that is necessary for 
the carrying out of his or her duties. The second 
question will require the Supreme Court to decide 
on whether or not the mere act of being present for 
the action is enough to take part in a class action 
suit, or if injury must be proved in order to validate 
the suit. 
The significant question of this case is if a class 
action can be certified when it contains parties who 
may not have been injured and thus have no right 
to pursue legal damages.3 In deciding this case, the 
Supreme Court will set the precedent of whether 
or not merely being party to damages is enough, 
and thus not having to prove actual injury. This 
case is significant as it is not a cut and dry case of 
uncompensated work for a set activity. The donning 
and doffing of protective clothing takes each 
employee a different amount of time.4 Thus it is hard 
to make a determination because those who take 
little time to don and doff protective clothing would 
legally not be able to claim uncompensated wages.5 
This case would overrule the precedent set in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 in which the Court stated 
that, in order for a class to be certified, all claims 
among class members must “depend on a common 
contention.”7 Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo is different 
from the Supreme Court’s previous decision in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes since Tyson Foods kept no 
time cards or video footage of the process of donning 
and doffing protective clothing. Consequently, there 
is no way to verify that all members of a class are 
eligible for damages. 
In conclusion, this case is significant as 
it represents a push by labor against a large 
industry such as Tyson Foods. The first question 
that arises from this case can be decided by a 
redefinition in labor law and determining whether 
donning a doffing protective equipment should be 
compensated. The second question, however, lies 
instead in the definition of a class and its eligibility 
for damages. In order to certify a class for a class 
action suit, one usually has to prove that each 
member of the suit was damaged in some way by 
the defendant. That would be nearly impossible 
in this case, as there are no tangible records and 
the class was certified for the original hearing by 
a lower court on the assumption that all members 
may or may not have been damaged by Tyson Foods 
Inc. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine if 
this assumption of damages is enough to warrant a 
class action, or if one must prove that all members 
of the class were injured in order to proceed.
1Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No.14-1146(2015).
2Ibid.
3Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech. “Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.” Oyez. 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1146 (accessed October 20, 2015). 
4“Supreme Court to Revisit Class-Certification Standards in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo | Class Defense Blog.” Class Defense Blog. June 8, 2015. Accessed October 
21, 2015. 
5Ibid.
6 “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.” Casebriefs WalMart Stores Inc v Dukes Comments. 
Accessed October 21, 2015. 
7“Supreme Court to Revisit Class-Certification Standards in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo | Class Defense Blog.” Class Defense Blog. June 8, 2015. Accessed October 
21, 2015. 
Bouaphakeo1
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Miller v. Davis: 
Sources
The Constitution of the United States expresses clearly that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.1” 
What is not so clear anymore, however, is the interpretation 
and application of these words, and Miller v Davis2 heavily 
debates the meaning of this amendment.
Kim Davis is a clerk from Kentucky who issues marriage 
licenses for a living. Recently, she has refused to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, arguing that this 
goes against her religious beliefs of what a marriage should 
constitute. Her claim clearly violated the Supreme Court’s 
previous ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,3 which made same-
sex marriage legal; hence, two same-sex couples and two 
opposite-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against 
Ms. Davis on July 1st of 2015.4 This issue escalated so much 
that Davis was found in contempt of court and was jailed 
for five days by U.S. District Judge, David Bunning.5
Davis claimed that issuing such license would “violate 
her Christian convictions against same-sex marriage.”6 
Supporters of Davis contend that sending her to jail for 
her choice thoroughly breaches her freedom of religion. 
One such supporter and former Arkansas Governor, 
Mike Huckabee, even stated, “I’m willing to spend the 
next eight years in jail, but I’m not willing to spend the 
next years in tyranny under people who think they can 
take our freedom and conscience away.”7 Her attorney 
Roger Gannam further argued that Davis should not 
resign because “accommodation of religious conscience 
is the law in Kentucky, including for elected officials.”8 He 
draws on this view from Kentucky’s Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act which, enacted in 2013, prohibits the state 
government from “substantially burdening a person’s 
freedom of religion unless the government proves it has 
a compelling interest in doing so and has used the least 
restrictive means to do it.”9 
On the other end of this debate are Davis’s critics, 
that believe her resistance to issue the licenses is a 
disobedience of the law. Judge Bunning affirmed, “The 
court cannot condone the willful disobedience of its 
lawfully issued order. If you give people the opportunity 
to choose which orders they follow, that’s what potentially 
causes problems.”10 In line with the judge, critics of Davis’s 
action assert that laws govern a nation, not subjective or 
discretionary decisions made by individuals.11 Though 
Davis has been released, she has been warned that she will 
find herself in jail again if she chooses to bar gay couples 
from obtaining marriage licenses.12
1U.S. Const. amend. I 
2 Miller v. Davis. 576 U.S. (2015)
3 Obergefell v. Hodges.  576 U.S. (2015)4“Miller V. Davis,” American Civil Liberties Union, last modified September 9, 2015, accessed 
October 15, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/cases/miller-v-davis5Jason Hanna, Ed Payne, and Catherine E Shoichet, “ Kim Davis released, but judge bars her from 
withholding marriage licenses,” CNN Politics, September 8, 2015
6Ibid7Ibid8Ibid
9Ibid
10Kathy Baldock, ““The Kim Davis Case Is About Disobeying The Rule Of Law, Not About Reli-
gious Liberty,” New Civil Rights Movement, September 3, 201511Ibid12Jason Hanna, Ed Payne, and Catherine E Shoichet, “ Kim Davis released, but judge bars her from 
withholding marriage licenses,” CNN Politics, September 8, 2015
Religious Freedom or 
Infringing the Law?
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By India Mazzarelli
Questrom ’17
Criminal (in)Justice in 
MassachusettsThe Commonwealth of Massachusetts has constantly taken pride in its progressive stances on issues such as healthcare, 
education, and civil rights. In fact, 
Massachusetts is ranked as the most 
liberal state.1 However, despite the 
unapologetically liberal lawyers, 
judges, and politicians that inhabit 
Massachusetts, the state remains 
comparatively passive on its 
Criminal Justice policies. 
In 1975, William Horton was 
convicted of first degree murder in 
Lawrence, MA and sentenced to life 
in prison without the possibility of 
parole.2 Eleven years later, in 1986, 
Horton was let out of prison as 
part of a Massachusetts weekend 
furlough program, and never 
reported back. A year later Horton 
raped and assaulted a couple in 
Maryland, a crime for which he was 
later convicted. 
At the time of his escape from the 
Massachusetts furlough program, 
Michael Dukakis was the governor 
and a presidential candidate. 
As governor, Dukakis took a 
progressive stance on preventing 
crime, understanding that “public 
safety required more than building 
prisons.”3 Dukakis was also a staunch 
advocate for the controversial 
furlough programs, which granted 
convicted first-degree murderers 
sentenced to life without parole the 
ability to be temporarily released 
from prison for certain occasions.4 
Dukakis’s stance on prison reform 
was used relentlessly against him 
in his presidential campaign; his 
opponents framed him as being 
lenient on crime by giving “weekend 
passes” to criminals. By the time 
of the election, the infamous name 
“Willie Horton” was synonymous 
with the Dukakis campaign. 
The rebuke of Dukakis for his 
stand on prison reform was a strong 
deterrent to any policymakers from 
making the same mistake: “They 
learned a bad lesson: not to go out on 
a limb.”5 The country took an adverse 
approach, the media attacked 
lenient judges, and in return, judges 
mandated longer sentences and 
neglected prison alternatives.6 By 
2010, the United States beat out 
Russia, China, and Iran for the 
country with the highest percentage 
of people in incarceration.7 
The effects of the Horton 
case were especially prevalent 
in Massachusetts. In 2012, at 
a time when many states were 
working to remove this legislation, 
after a parole officer was shot, 
Massachusetts enacted a three 
strikes bill, removing the possibility 
of parole for repeat  offenders.8 In 
early 2012 The Supreme Court ruled 
it unconstitutional for juveniles 
convicted of first degree murder to 
be sentenced to life in prison without 
the possibility of parole. Following 
this ruling in 2014, the Massachusetts 
District Attorneys Association 
supported legislation that would 
require juveniles who are tried and 
sentenced to life in prison for first-
degree murder to serve a minimum 
of 35 years before the opportunity 
for parole.9 Essex District Attorney, 
Jonathan W. Blodgett, said about the 
decision, “while not ideal, 35 years 
of incarceration would provide 
victims’ families with some sense of 
justice.”10 
The aftermath of the Willie Horton 
case is still influential over much 
of the criminal justice legislation 
passed in Massachusetts. For years, 
lawmakers remained paralyzed by 
the effects that the name “Horton” 
had on Dukakis’s failed presidential 
campaign. With the increasing 
burden of overcrowded and 
underfunded prisons, it is crucial 
for Massachusetts to escape the 
ominous “Willie Horton” shadow 
that has presided over its legislative 
decisions for years. 
Sources
1Newport, “Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana Most Conser-
vative States,” Gallup, February 6th 2015, accessed October 18th 2015
2Levenson, “Willie Horton and the Rise and Fall of Mass 
Incarceration,” May 14th 2015, accessed October 18, 2015
3Gertner, “After Horton Case, Massachusetts fell behind on 
criminal justice, May 18th 2014, accessed October 18, 2015
4Toner, “Prison Furloughs in Massachusetts Threaten 
Dukakis Record on Crime, July 5th 1988, accessed October 15th 2015. 
5Schwartzapfel and Keller, “Willie Horton Revisited,” The 
Marshall Project, May 13th 2015, accessed October 15th 2015
6Levenson, Ibid. 
7“U.S. Should Significantly Reduce Rate of Incarceration,” 
National Academies, April 30th 2014, accessed October 18, 
2015. 
8Johnson and Ballou, “Deval Patrick Signs Repeat Offender 
Crime Bill at Private Statehouse Ceremony,” August 2nd 2012, 
accessed October 18th2015. 
9Valencia, “State District Attorneys Recommend that Juve-
nile Murderers Serve At least 35 years,” The Boston Globe, 
January 18th 2015, accessed October 19, 2015. 
10Ibid. 
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FEMA: 
In Need of Some 
Disaster Relief
and a multitude of other class action 
lawsuits have been successfully 
leveled against FEMA, many of these 
serve to increase the cost of FEMA 
operations considerably. Converting 
just five percent of every emergency 
housing area to a wheelchair user 
accessible area costs an estimated 
$2.5 to $18.4 million.9  While there 
have been many successful attempts 
to rein in FEMA via lawsuits, 
prohibitive costs unfortunately 
impede substantive progress. 
By Isaiah Tharan 
CAS ’18The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a government agency that is usually not called to mind until a 
disaster strikes. Throughout its nearly 
forty-year lifespan, FEMA has faced 
more than its share of controversies. 
Complaints against the agency include 
that FEMA often appears to have some 
bias against lower class areas and does 
not provide adequate support in critical 
times. Due to these issues, the National 
Center for Law and Economic Justice 
(NCLEJ) has recently filed a civil rights 
complaint against FEMA to ensure 
disaster relief, specifically housing, to 
people of all backgrounds including 
those with disabilities.1 
FEMA’s insufficient aid for disabled 
Americans came to light after 
Hurricane Sandy, but this was not the 
first time FEMA was caught in a storm 
of controversy. One salient example is 
their handling of Hurricane Katrina. 
Many argued that FEMA did not 
respond in time, as well as that its pre-
set housing units were not equipped 
for the conditions, and in some cases 
dangerous.2  FEMA apparently gave 
away over $85 million worth of goods 
intended for Louisiana to other states.3 
Complaints against FEMA culminated 
in the class action lawsuit McWaters v. 
FEMA.4  This case prompted FEMA to 
alter its system for temporary housing. 
Unlike before, evacuees did not need 
to fill out loan forms before getting 
access to shelter and would receive a 
two-week notice before being forced 
to leave their newfound homes.5  These 
past cases inspired the National Center 
for Law and Economic Justice (NCLEJ) 
to file a case against FEMA to ensure 
aid for all American citizens in the 
event of a disaster.
The NCLEJ is no stranger to 
backing civil rights cases against 
FEMA, including the McWaters v. 
FEMA lawsuit.  Prior to this case, 
many emergency trailer park housing 
areas were  completely inaccessible 
to physically challenged citizens.6 
The NCLEJ claimed this violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.7  The 
court ruled in their favor and declared 
that five percent of all emergency 
housing must be wheelchair user 
accessible and that other reasonable 
accommodations must be made for 
physically challenged citizens.8 
The main obstacle to fulfilling these 
promises is obviously the financial 
burden. Although the NCLEJ lawsuit 
1 “Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Architectural 
Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines; Emergency 
Transportable Housing Units.” Federal Register. May 7, 14. 
Accessed October 20, 2015.
2 Davis, Tom. “The Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina.” The 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. February 15, 2006. 
Accessed October 21, 2015.  
3 Zamost, Scott, and Abbie Boudreau. “FEMA Gives Away $85 
Million of Supplies for Katrina Victims.” CNN. June 10, 2008. 
Accessed October 23, 2015. 
4 McWaters, Beatrice. “Https://casetext.com/case/mcwa-
ters-v-federal-emergency-management-agency-2.” Casetext. 
June 16, 2006. Accessed October 23, 2015.
5 ibid. 
6 “ Highlights of NCLEJ Advocacy.” NCLEJ. May 27, 2015. 
Accessed October 22, 2015. 
7 “Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Architectural 
Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines; Emergency 
Transportable Housing Units.” Federal Register. May 7, 14. 
Accessed October 20, 2015. 
8 ibid.
9 ibid.  
“FEMA’s insufficient aid for disabled Americans came to 
light after Hurricane Sandy, but this was not the first time 
FEMA was caught in a storm of controversy.”
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Standing on the Thin Line Between Abuse and Discipline 
C
orporal punishment of 
children is generally 
frowned upon in various 
social settings yet it is 
practiced with startling 
frequency. A 2013 report from 
Child Trends revealed that about 
94 percent of parents with children 
aged 3 to 4 have engaged in corporal 
punishment in the past year.1 
Furthermore, 80 percent of men 
and 65 percent of women reported 
that children sometimes need some 
“good hard spanking.”2  For many 
years, laws regarding parental 
corporal punishment were vague 
and were adjudicated on a case-by-
case basis.3  This flexibility can be 
attributed to the ongoing controversy 
in the issue of child protection and 
of parents’ privilege in disciplining 
their children. In June of 2015 the 
MA Supreme Court restructured the 
framework for parental privilege 
cases when it unanimously reversed 
a case where a father was convicted 
of spanking his three year old. This 
decision led to more controversy 
rather than clarification.4
In the case of Commonwealth v. 
Jean G. Dorvil, the defendant was 
initially charged guilty for publicly 
spanking his child in Brockton, on 
May 13, 2011.5   According to the 
testimony of Detective Ernest Bell, 
the defendant verbally assaulted the 
child, kicked the child in the backside, 
smacked the child on the bottom, 
and expressed explicit anger.6  The 
defendant claimed that he and his 
child were “playing” and denied 
assaulting his daughter, but despite 
the defense, he was charged with 
assault and battery.7  The Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) later overturned 
the decision and, for the first time, 
recognized the parental privilege 
defense.8  The Supreme Judicial 
Court delineated that a parent or 
guardian may not be subjected to 
criminal liability for the use of force 
By Claire Park
CAS ’16
against a minor child under his or 
her care, given that 1) the force used 
is reasonable; 2) the force is for 
safeguarding or promoting welfare 
of the minor; 3) the force neither 
causes, nor creates a substantial 
risk of causing, physical harm, gross 
degradation, or mental distress.  9 
The SJC reasoned that corporal 
punishment has been established 
in our society as an integral part of 
parenting and parental autonomy that 
furthers children’s welfare.10  Hence, 
the SJC has attempted to arbitrate 
parental rights and protection of 
children from abuse by accentuating 
the reasonableness of the use of force. 
In spite of this effort, the 
controversy still remains. The 
opponents contend that the SJC’s 
decision extenuates and normalizes 
parental aggression. Jetta Bernier 
of the Massachusetts Citizens for 
Children noted that the ruling “implies 
that physical punishment can, in fact, 
support the welfare of children.”11  In 
the case of Dorvil, the Commonwealth 
further argued that the age of the 
child and his or her comprehension 
ability must be considered in 
assessing the reasonableness of the 
use of force.12  To children who do 
not understand the consequences 
of behavior, corporal punishment 
does not communicate what they did 
wrong, why they are being punished, 
and what are the alternate positive 
behaviors. To them, it is just hostility 
from their primary attachment 
figure. Due to this, experts maintain 
that, though the observable physical 
harm may be minimal, the mental 
distress and its implication in child 
development are not negligible. The 
research conducted on representative 
sample from the United States found 
that physical punishment increases 
the risk of mood disorders, substance 
abuse, and personality disorder.13 
Furthermore, in 2012, a research 
study conducted by Brendan L. Smith 
showed that corporal punishment 
is cyclical —children who received 
spanking are more likely to use 
force in solving problems in human 
1 Peter Schworm, “SJC affirms parental rights to discipline 
their children,” Boston Globe, last modified June 25, 2015, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/25/mass-
high-court-outlines-legal-rules-spanking/AA75Y9oVRkEBG-
WIXCoY2fO/story.html 
2 Ibid. 
3 “Parental rights: corporal punishment,” TheWordOut.net, 
accessed October 13, 2015, http://www.thewordout.net/
pages/page.asp?page_id=56657 
4 Commonwealth v. Jean G. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1 (2015)
5 ibid
6 ibid 
7 ibid
8 ibid
9 ibid
10 ibid 
11 Peter Schworm, “SJC affirms parental rights to discipline 
their children,” Boston Globe, last modified June 25, 2015, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/25/mass-
high-court-outlines-legal-rules-spanking/AA75Y9oVRkEBG-
WIXCoY2fO/story.html
12 Commonwealth v. Jean G. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1 (2015)
13 Tracy O. Afifi et al., “Physical punishment and mental dis-
orders: results from a nationally representative U.S. sample,” 
Pediatrics 130, no. 2 (2012): 184-192
14 Brendan L. Smith, “The case against spanking,” American 
Psychology Association 43, no. 4 (2012): 60
interaction, possibly explaining why 
corporal punishment is so fixed in 
our society as a disciplinary action.14 
However, such impacts in children’s 
behavior and psychology are 
protracted over a long developmental 
period. Thus, it is difficult to make 
an immediate judgment in the legal 
arena on the reasonableness of 
corporal punishment based on those 
factors. 
The dilemma between parental 
rights in disciplining their own 
children and the assurance of 
children’s safety from physical 
and mental harm is not easily 
resolved. Corporal punishment 
can be a low-cost, time-efficient 
disciplinary method. However, 
the long-term detriments on child 
development should not be ignored. 
In order to assess the issue more 
completely, the law should focus 
not on the reasonableness of 
corporal punishment but on the 
reasonableness of parenting itself 
and its methods of discipline. Instead 
of encouraging reasonable physical 
punishment, the Supreme Judicial 
Court should take disparate measures 
to encourage reasonable alternate 
modes of discipline that do not inflict 
foreseeable harm on the youth.  
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On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its decision in the case of Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.1 The case began 
when the nonprofit corporation 
Citizens United released a politically 
biased documentary centered on then-
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. 
To distribute the film, they attempted 
to use general treasury funds, and were 
immediately met with accusations of 
unfair usage of funds and unwelcome 
influence on the political process.2 
The case quickly became a hallmark 
of free expression and the influence of 
money in politics. The FEC argued that 
such uninhibited use of funds from 
corporations would lead to corruption 
in elections, with no legal basis for such 
spending on behalf of corporations, 
while Citizens United argued that such 
spending was an expression protected 
by the First Amendment. 
In a 5-4 decision that overruled 
two previous cases, the Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of Citizens 
United. Using the justification of 
First Amendment rights, the decision 
effectively defined the rights and 
protections of citizens to corporations, 
and recognized unchecked spending 
as an expression of free speech.3 
The result of this decision was, not 
unexpectedly, uproarious around 
the nation. In twenty-four states, 
most notably Connecticut, the ruling 
challenged preexisting regulations 
on corporate political expenditures. 
Subsequent court decisions to address 
these issues kept in line with the 
SCOTUS decision in Citizens United, 
as the court decision has come to be 
referred. Campaign donations in the 
U.S. were already a complicated affair 
prior to the decision, with Political 
Action Committees (PACs), SuperPACs, 
501(c)(3-6) bodies, and more offering 
venues to undisclosed and tax-exempt 
donations.4 But it was undeniably clear 
that these donation capabilities had 
further basis to expand with Citizens.
Today, the issue of political 
donations affecting elections is more 
pertinent than ever, especially as 
the 2016 presidential race begins. 
Citizens United itself has been targeted 
specifically by candidates including 
Bernie Sanders, and defended by many 
other (largely Republican) candidates. 
Regardless of political opinion, it 
is undeniable that large donations 
from rich families, individuals, and 
corporations have an enormous hold 
on the existing candidate field. In a 
supported study by The New York 
Times, it was found that only 158 actors 
donated over half of all early funds to 
candidates.5 Of the candidates at the 
time of writing this article, only two 
receive primarily “grassroots,” small-
dollar donations (Sanders, Carson). 
Many candidates are almost entirely 
dependent upon large SuperPAC and 
Committee donations (Clinton, Chafee, 
O’Malley). And even more rely on 
individual millionaire backing in large 
sums (Bush, Cruz, Huckabee, Rubio, 
Walker). Chafee and Trump are mostly 
self-dependent.6
The major concern is the influence 
that major donors can have on candidate 
stances and motivations, to the extent 
that rich corporations could influence 
Congressional and Presidential 
decisions by dint of finance. Concrete 
data exists, for example, showing 
the very real influence lobbying has 
had on environmental congressional 
measures in the early 21st century.7
There are doubtless questions 
to be answered on the legitimacy of 
Citizens and its approximations of 
corporations. It is only the beginning 
of the issue of campaign finance, but 
soon, Citizens may be forced to answer 
to American citizens.
Citizens United, Citizens Divided: 
The Role of the Supreme Court in Campaign 
Finance
By Kaitlyn Perriault
CAS ’18
1 Sullivan, Kristin. “Summary of Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.” Olr Research Report. 2 March 2010. Accessed 
18 October 2015. 
2Ibid.
3Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Supreme Court 
of the United States. Jan 21 2010. Accessed Oct 18 2015.
4Freeman, Jennifer, et al. “A Climate of Corporate Control: How 
Corporations Have Influenced the U.S. Dialogue on Climate Sci-
ence and Policy”. Scientific Integrity Program of the UCS. 2012. 
Web, 12 April 2015.
5Confessore, Nicholas, et al.”Buying Power”. The New York 
Times. October 10, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2015.
6Kurtzleben, Danielle. “The Shapes of Presidential Candidates’ 
Donations. NPR. Aug 28, 2015. Accessed Oct 18, 2015.
7Freeman, Jennifer, et al. “A Climate of Corporate Control: How 
Corporations Have Influenced the U.S. Dialogue on Climate Sci-
ence and Policy”. Scientific Integrity Program of the UCS. 2012. 
Web, 12 April 2015.
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By Katherine Harper
CAS ’17
New Proposed Rule Addresses 
Discrimination in 
Healthcare Settings O n September 8, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a proposed rule prohibiting discrimination in 
healthcare settings. The rule, 
Nondiscrimination in Health 
Programs and Activities, expands 
upon Section 1557 of the Affordable 
Care Act and prohibits discrimination 
based on national origin, sex, and 
disability.1 It codifies a prohibition 
against discrimination toward 
transgender patients, a group that 
has been particularly vulnerable 
in years past.2 The rule contains 
specific requirements for retrofitting 
existing buildings and requirements 
for new buildings designed to 
accommodate individuals with 
physical disabilities. It addresses 
disparities in health services based 
on gender and expands mandatory 
language assistance tools.  Health 
care professionals agree that the rule 
highlights a heretofore overlooked 
area of Section 1557.3  However, most 
agree that implementing the new rule 
will be challenging. 
Parts of this rule are new and 
groundbreaking, other parts 
merely reiterate past rules and 
regulations. The prohibition against 
discriminating against patients on 
the basis of national origin expands 
on existing rules and regulations 
enacted to comply with Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Prior 
regulations addressed the need 
for health care facilities to provide 
interpreters for Limited English 
Proficient (LEP) patients free of 
charge. The new proposed rule 
expands the requirements to include 
taglines for the top 15 languages 
spoken nationally. The taglines advise 
the patient, in his/her preferred 
language, that language services are 
available without cost.5  The intent 
of the proposed regulation is to 
increase meaningful communication 
between the LEP patient and his/
her health care providers, to improve 
patient outcomes and to ultimately 
cut healthcare costs by reducing re-
admissions due to misunderstandings 
of post discharge care.   
The proposed rule also addresses 
issues that are pertinent to our 
current diverse population. Issues 
of discriminatory practices between 
male, female and intersexed patients 
are addressed. The rule specifically 
discusses equal treatment options 
without regard to the gender of 
the patient.6 If the rule is finalized, 
treatment could not be refused 
based on the sex or intersex of the 
patient. After publishing a Request 
for Information (RFI) on August 1, 
2013, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
received over 300 comments from 
members of the LGBT community, 
particularly transgendered 
individuals who detailed their 
own personal experiences with 
discrimination and disparagement 
in a healthcare setting.7 This RFI 
prompted the promulgation of the 
new rule mandating that section 1557 
of ACA applies to all individuals, not 
just hetero/cisgender individuals. 
The proposed rule contains a 
number of specific requirements 
for retrofitting existing and new 
construction buildings.8 The intent 
is to allow patients with physical 
challenges to move about health care 
facilities without impediments.
As our population becomes 
increasingly diverse, the importance 
of effective communication and 
equal access in healthcare become 
more crucial.  The new proposed 
rule addresses many of the issues 
that limit access to our healthcare 
system.  Proponents of the rule 
believe that increasing access to and 
communication within our hospitals 
and health service organizations will 
ultimately be universally beneficial. 
1 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 54172-54221, 
(September 8, 2015)
2 “HHS Proposes New Regulations Prohibiting Discrimi-
nation Against Transgender Individuals” last modified on 
September 24, 2015 http://www.quarles.com/publica-
tions/%E2%80%8Bhhs-proposes-new-regulations-prohibi-
ting-discrimination-against-transgender-individuals/
3 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 54172-54221, 
(September 8, 2015)
4 “Fact Sheet: Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and 
Activities Proposed Rule” last modified September 2015
file:///C:/Users/Katie/Downloads/Fact%20Sheet_%20Non-
discrimination%20in%20Health%20Programs%20and%20
Activities%20Proposed%20Rule.html
5 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 54172-54221, 
(September 8, 2015)
6 Ibid7 Ibid
8 “HHS takes next step in advancing health equity through the 
Affordable Care Act” last modified on September 3, 2015
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It is not unknown to Americans that gun control is a divisive topic. Currently there has been a multitude of school shootings, and for this reason, the regulations 
on guns have been brought into 
political debate more heavily.  Neither 
Republicans nor Democrats believe 
Americans should not be able to 
possess guns because the Second 
Amendment states, “A well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”1 But on one hand, the 
Democrats believe that there needs 
to be a “reasonable regulation” when 
it comes to owning firearms.2 On the 
other hand, Republicans believe that 
one should be able to possess firearms 
and ammunition without regulations.3
Accounting for the gravity of the 
matter, there are laws and regulations 
already placed on the possession 
of firearms. For example, the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 
1994, better known as the Brady Act, 
is the one law that is constant in every 
state. Under federal law, the Brady 
Act requires criminal background 
check in anyone who wishes to own a 
gun.4 Through the background check, 
it seeks to prevent gun ownership in 
criminals, the underaged, those with 
mental illness, and others that are not 
fit to possess weapons. Even with this 
law enacted, however, there are still 
ways around the background check. 
One major issue, that the Democrats 
especially have a problem with, is gun-
show loopholes. The term “gun-show 
loophole” mainly refers to the selling 
of guns at gun shows, but it generally 
means any private transaction. The 
problem with these private transactions 
is that no background check happens; 
therefore, anyone that should not own 
a firearm is capable of owning one.5 
Another problem with the 
background checks is the issue of 
mental illness. When the Brady Act 
was established, the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System 
(“NICS”) was also established. This 
is the database through which all 
background checks are run when 
someone wishes to buy a firearm. Just 
like the Brady Act, there are loopholes 
in the NICS. Federal law does not 
require states to submit mental health 
information to the NICS, and thus 
participation is strictly voluntary. 
Furthermore, in order to be recognized 
as mentally ill under the Brady Act, 
one must be acknowledged by a court 
official; however, there are numerous 
people with mental problems who have 
not been acknowledged by the courts.6 
For this reason, these people would 
not be registered as being mentally 
incapable of owning a gun.
The Republican side has been 
known to be fighting heavily against 
gun control but what they are fighting 
for is much deeper. They do not believe 
that every individual should possess 
firearms if they are not suited to; they 
instead believe that, in lieu of the federal 
government, each state should be the 
one to enact certain ownership rights. 
One possible reason could be that many 
of the traditional Republican states are 
in the Midwest or South, where a great 
deal of their population is hunters. 
One area where the two sides 
harmonize is that of mental health. 
The Republicans and Democrats agree 
that new laws need to be enacted so 
people like the Sandy Hook shooter 
are not capable of owning a firearm.7 
As most people know, the Republicans 
have on their side the National Rifle 
Association (NRA), the largest firearms 
education organization in the world. 
NRA is also possibly the biggest 
advocate for the protection of the 
Second Amendment. In fact, the NRA 
Institute for Legislative Action (ILA) 
was created in 1975 for the sole reason 
of defending their interpretation of the 
Second Amendment.8 The NRA-ILA has 
a great deal of influence on elections, 
whether they are presidential, federal, 
or congressional. Its impact could be 
seen in 2014, when more than 90% of 
candidates who were endorsed by the 
NRA won their elections.9
When it comes to gun control, there 
seems to be a clear divide between the 
Republicans and the Democrats. One 
wants regulations for all and the other 
wants minimal or no regulations at all. 
They can both agree that unnecessary 
shootings, especially in schools, need to 
be stopped, but as to how they should 
be stopped is something on which 
they cannot agree. They both know 
that there needs to be some regulation 
in terms of prohibiting the mentally 
handicapped from possessing firearms. 
Unfortunately, neither side can deny 
the statistics. According to the Brady 
Campaign, on average 32,514 people 
die annually from gun violence, and 
no matter what side you support, the 
number needs to change.10
By Kelsie Merrick
CAS ’18
The Different Sides to Gun 
Control 
1 “Second Amendment.” LII / Legal Information Institute. 
Accessed October 13, 2015. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
second_amendment#.Vh6oHPlViko.
2 “Democratic Party on Gun Control.” On the Issues. April 28, 
2015. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.ontheissues.org/
Celeb/Democratic_Party_Gun_Control.htm.
3 “Republican Party on Gun Control.” On the Issues. April 28, 
2015. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.ontheissues.org/
Celeb/Republican_Party_Gun_Control.htm.
4 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, H.R. 1025 (1993).
5 “Background on Gun Control.” On the Issues. Accessed October 
13, 2015. http://www.ontheissues.org/Background_Gun_Control.
htm.
6 “Federal Law on Mental Health Reporting.” Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence RSS. May 21, 2012. Accessed October 14, 
2015. http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-mental-health-re-
porting/.
7 “Republican Views on Gun Control.” Republican Views. 
December 27, 2013. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://www.
republicanviews.org/republican-views-on-gun-control/.
8 “A Brief History of the NRA.” NRA. Accessed October 15, 2015. 
https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/.
9 “NRA-ILA | Chris W. Cox.” NRA-ILA. Accessed October 15, 2015. 
https://www.nraila.org/about/chris-cox-nra/.
10 “Key Gun Violence Statistics.” Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun 
Violence. Accessed October 13, 2015. http://www.bradycam-
paign.org/key-gun-violence-statistics.
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By Natalie Goldberg
CAS ’17
G
eorge W. Bush enacted 
the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003 with the 
knowledge that various 
provisions expanded executive 
authority over diplomatic relations. 
The bill authorized appropriations 
and diplomatic measures to better 
relations with US international 
counterparts.1 In the past, presidents 
have had the power to recognize other 
countries, though this is not explicitly 
listed in the Constitution. Article II, 
section three relays the presidential 
authority to appoint ambassadors 
and public ministers. Appointments 
of this nature would be impossible 
without first recognizing the country 
to which these ambassadors are 
going.2  However, there is no dispute 
mechanism to resolve when Congress 
disagrees with the president’s choice 
to recognize a country.3 The impacts 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act of 2003 still remain relevant, 
especially within the case Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry case, 576 U.S. __ (2015), 
where the Court ruled on the matter 
of balancing presidential recognition 
power and Congress’ role in foreign 
affairs.
Menachem Zivotofsky had been 
born in Jerusalem, and when his 
parents applied for him to get a 
U.S. passport, they requested that 
it list his place of birth as “Israel,” 
in accordance with of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of 2003. 
Section 214(d) of this bill states that 
the Secretary of State should label 
“Israel” as the birthplace of anyone 
born in Jerusalem applying for a 
U.S. passport.4  However, the State 
Department informed them that 
because the president recognizes 
Jerusalem as a neutral city, and not a 
part of Israel, the passport must say 
“Jerusalem,” directly countering the 
2003 act. The parents challenged this 
decision, leading up to thirteen years 
of deliberations. The Supreme Court 
ultimately determined that the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act Section 
214(d) in fact is unconstitutional 
because it contradicts presidential 
recognition of Jerusalem as neutral.5
The Supreme Court ruled that 
this case was a separation of powers 
issue involving presidential power 
of recognition and congressional 
statements that go against the former. 
The majority decision of the Court 
argued that because recognition 
power had been used by the president 
throughout history and is exclusive, 
Congress should not have the ability 
to interfere. The Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act formally contradicts 
this notion and would force the 
president to change views on not 
recognizing Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel. Therefore, the majority of 
the Court reasoned that the statute is 
unconstitutional and also recognized 
it as a deliberate act by Congress to 
show disapproval in a presidential 
policy. To appeal to Congress, the Court 
did enumerate congressional roles 
in plenty of matters of foreign affairs 
including making treaties, declaring 
war, and confirming an ambassador 
appointment.6 To address the topic of 
a separation of powers, the dissenters 
explained that no branch should have 
exclusive powers of any component 
of foreign affairs. Each branch should 
be able to contradict the statutes of 
another, as had been done.7
Ultimately, the Court discussed 
limitations that branches impose 
on one another when one opposes 
1  “George W. Bush: Statement on Signing the Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.” The American Pres-
idency Project. September 30, 2002. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63928.
2 Alan Morrison, Symposium: President wins in Zivotofsky: 
Will there be another battle?, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 9, 2015, 3:39 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-
president-wins-in-zivotofsky-will-there-be-another-battle/
3 Ibid
4  “Zivotofsky v. Kerry.” SCOTUSblog RSS. 2015. Accessed 
October 14, 2015.
5 Amy Howe, Executive branch prevails in Jerusalem 
passports case:  In Plain English, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 8, 2015, 
9:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/execu-
tive-branch-prevails-in-jerusalem-passports-case-in-plain-en-
glish
6 Ibid.
7 Alan Morrison, Symposium: President wins in Zivotofsky: 
Will there be another battle?, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 9, 2015, 3:39 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-
president-wins-in-zivotofsky-will-there-be-another-battle/
8Ibid.
the policies of another. Emerging 
questions as a result of this case may 
consist of whether the president 
should have the sole power to 
recognize foreign entities, if Congress 
should play a role in this process, 
and how to balance competing 
interests of opposing branches when 
dealing with international diplomacy. 
Another important implication of this 
particular case is the idea of which 
branch has power in recognizing 
territories engaged in conflict. For 
example, Jerusalem had been a 
long disputed territory for religious 
groups, which is why the executive 
branch does not label it an official 
part of Israel. The Court addressed 
concerns such as reactions to the 
law from the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.8 The ruling that the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
Section 214(d) is unconstitutional 
leaves room for further discussion 
about the role of Congress in foreign 
affairs, mainly balancing foreign 
power between legislative and 
executive branches.
Separation of Powers 
and 
Foreign Recognition
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A
merica is one of the only Western countries 
that allows for the death penalty: over two-
thirds of the countries in the world have 
abolished the death penalty either in law or in 
practice. In 2010, the overwhelming majority 
of all known executions took place in China, Iran, North 
Korea, Yemen, and the United States.1 The fact that the 
U.S. is still enacting the death penalty when most of the 
world has stopped is a fact that demands our attention and 
requires us to ask whether or not the U.S. should reform its 
current system of capital punishment. 
In the U.S. at the end of 2013, 35 states and the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons held nearly 3,000 inmates on death 
row.2 Since the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the death 
penalty in 1976, 82% of all executions have taken place 
in the South, with 37% of them occurring in Texas. 1 It is 
clear that there are regional differences among the states 
and that while the incidents of capital punishment may be 
concentrated in a few key areas it is a matter of national 
importance. 
The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world. 
About 2.4 million people in America are in prison or jail.3 
Politicians often describe their approach as being “tough 
on crime,” in an attempt to garner support across a variety 
of socio-economic levels. Tactics like this also claim 
that putting people on death row will deter others from 
committing crimes. However, putting more people in jail is 
an increased strain on taxpayers. 
Regardless of the cost to citizens, one could argue that 
putting people on death row serves as a reminder to all 
that crime has serious consequences. This idea, however, 
is challenged by insights found in a study conducted by the 
National Academy of Sciences. The study states that 4% 
of death row inmates are innocent. While this may seem 
like a small percentage, in reality it is an exceptionally 
large oversight. These innocent people are forced to live 
in captivity and are then executed. This is merely one of 
the many facts advocates against capital punishment cite 
to defend eliminating the practice altogether.4
This debate was brought to national attention when 
there was a case of a botched execution in Ohio. On 
September 17, 2009 Romell Broom was to be sentenced 
to death via lethal injection. During the execution, the 
executioners administering the lethal injection struggled 
to find a suitable vein in his arms or legs. After 2 hours of 
writhing and grimacing with pain, one of Broom’s lawyers 
wrote to Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer 
imploring him to end the procedure. The lawyer explained 
that this would “violate Ohio’s statutory requirement 
that a lethal injection execution be quick and painless.” 
He was granted a temporary reprieve from Governor Ted 
Strickland and is currently still on death row.5
Similar instances have been reported numerous times, 
with varying degrees of severity. Perhaps the most notable 
instance occurred on April 29th, 2014 in Oklahoma. 
Clayton D. Lockett was supposed to be executed via lethal 
injection. The state refused to divulge any information on 
the experimental drugs, making it difficult to predict any 
complications that could have arisen. For the first hour, 
the executioner was struggling to find a useable vein. 
Then a sedative was administered because the following 
two lethal drugs were known to cause “excruciating pain.” 
However, Lockett was conscious and began clenching his 
teeth and thrashing around in pain three minutes after 
the second and third drugs were administered. Fifteen 
minutes later, witnesses were told to leave the room. 
Lockett died 43 minutes later from a heart attack.6
There is a long history of complications in executions, 
which beg the question of whether or not the practice is 
morally sound. Regardless of its legality, what happened to 
Broom and Lockett depicts the flawed nature of the capital 
punishment system. The Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects against cruel and unusual 
punishment by the federal government. The Supreme 
Court ruled that this clause also applies to the states. 
Although it would appear as though lethal injection and 
experimental drugs should be classified in this category, 
executions of this nature are still perpetrated. 
Such examples are unsettling to hear and force us to 
question the nature of capital punishment: is there a place 
for these types of actions in a country that is supposed to 
represent one of the most advanced places in the world? 
If America is going to continue the practice of capital 
punishment, it is clear that finding a more humane and 
reliable alternative is vital. 
By Neha Narula
Questrom ’16
HUMANITY IN THE REALM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2015).2 Robert Pear, “Flood of Briefs on the Health Care Law’s Subsidies Hits the Supreme Court,” New 
York Times, last modified February 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/flood-
of-briefs-on-the-health-care-laws-subsidies-hits-the-supreme-court.html?src=xps.
3 Ibid.4 Abbe R. Gluck, “King v. Burwell Isn’t About Obamacare,” Politico Magazine, last modified 
February 27, 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/king-v-burwell-states-
rights-115550.html#ixzz3T6RfoymO.5 “Map: How Many Americans Could Lose Subsidies If the Supreme Court Rules for the Plaintiffs 
in King vs. Burwell?,” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, accessed February 28, 2015, 
http://kff.org/interactive/king-v-burwell/.
6 “Justices to weigh subsidies for health insurance: In Plain English,” SCOTUSblog, accessed 
March 26,2015, http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/justices-to-weigh-subsidies-for-health-
insurance-in-plain-english/
7 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, State Flexibility Relating to Exchanges, U.S.C. 111-
148 § 1321.
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In Support of SUPPORT?: 
1SUPPORT Study Group of the Eunice Kennedy Shriver NICHD Neonatal Research Network, 
“Target Ranges of Oxygen Saturation in Extremely Preterm Infants,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine 362 (2010): 1959-1969, accessed October 12, 2015, DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa0911781.
2 Sabrina Tavernise, “Study of Babies Did Not Disclose Risks, U.S. Finds,” The New York Times, 
April, 10, 2013.
3ibid
4Looney v. Moore, No.: 2:13-cv-00733-KOB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106517 (N.D. Ala., August 13, 
2015).
5Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829-30 (Ala. 2001)
6John D. Lantos, “Vindication for SUPPORT,” The New England Journal of Medicine 373 (2015): 
1393-1395, accessed October 12, 2015, DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1510876.
7David G. Owen, “The Five Elements of Negligence,” Hofstra Law Review 35, no. 4 (2007): 1671-
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8Sabrina Tavernise, “Premature Babies Study Raises Debate Over Risks and Ethical Consent,” The 
New York Times, September 7, 2015.
9Amy Yurkanin, “UAB study probably did not cause injuries to premature babies, judge rules,” 
AL.com, September 10, 2015, accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.al.com/news/birming-
ham/index.ssf/2015/09/uab_study_probably_did_not_cau.html.
By Ryan Knox 
SAR ’16
Legal and Ethical Implications of Looney v. MooreThe Surfactant, Positive Pressure, and Pulse Oximetry Randomized Trial Study, better known as the SUPPORT Study, has come under national scrutiny for its questionable research practices, which in part led to the case in Alabama, Looney 
v. Moore. The SUPPORT study was  conducted by 23 
academic institutions, which assessed the standard of care 
procedures for extremely premature infants.1 The current 
standard of care for preterm infants’ is maintaining oxygen 
saturation levels between 85% and 95%, and researchers 
in the study were trying to determine the optimum target 
saturation ranges within the standard.2 In the study, 
premature infants were randomly divided into the low 
range group (85-89%) or the high range group (91-95%) 
for oxygen; however, the informed consent signed by the 
parents did not include the risks associated with each 
of these groups, including retinopathy of prematurity 
(ROP), neurological issues, and unknown differences in 
mortality rates.3 In 2013, some of these infants developed 
neurological issues and ROP, and their parents sued 
University of Alabama-Birmingham Hospital in which they 
were enrolled in the study, on their children’s behalf.
Looney v. Moore, the lawsuit in the United States District 
Court of Alabama, was decided on August 13, 2015, when 
Judge Bowdre granted the defendants summary judgment.4 
The main arguments of the plaintiffs were the physician’s 
negligence in their research practices and the lack of 
informed consent, resulting in injury and increased risk 
of injury to the premature infants.5 To prove a negligence 
case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 
had a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that 
duty, the plaintiff suffered damages after this breach, and 
these damages were probably and foreseeably caused by 
this breach of duty.7 In this case, summary judgement was 
given because the plaintiff could not adequately prove 
causation; although some premature babies may have 
suffered adverse effects after the treatment, the plaintiff 
could not prove that their conditions were a result of 
the SUPPORT Study as opposed to being born extremely 
premature. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the 
damages included increased risk of future injury, which is 
not defined as damage under Alabama Law.4, 5, 6 
The implications of the Looney v. Moore decision have 
been highly debated. In The New England Journal of 
Medicine, Dr. John Lantos, a bioethicist and professor at 
University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine and 
Children’s Mercy Hospital, described the decision as “a 
vindication of both the investigators and the U.S. system 
of research oversight.”6 He indicated that Judge Bowdre’s 
decision represents support of the researchers’ study 
and methods; however his view is not representative 
of the whole bioethics community. A New York Times 
article quoted Professor George Annas, the Chair of the 
Department of Health Law, Bioethics and Human Rights at 
Boston University, who stated that the informed consent of 
the study was still viewed as inadequate and the decision 
“simply meant that the families could not prove the study 
had caused the injuries.”8 
The opinion itself does not validate the informed consent 
forms and procedures used by the physicians and scientists 
involved in the SUPPORT Study. The lawsuit decided only 
on whether the injuries, health effects, and future risks 
were more likely than not caused by the actions of the 
SUPPORT Study. As the physicians’ operations were within 
the standard of care and the effects were not uncommon 
for extremely preterm infants, the plaintiffs could not 
prove causation. Despite the decision, the lawyer for the 
plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal.9 Although the future 
of the case is unclear, further decisions on the nature of 
the study’s informed consent and research practices could 
be nationally significant, affecting the manner in which 
physicians and scientists conduct medical research.
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By Shanti Khanna
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Boston’s Legacy of Racial Segregation  
A
ccording to 2010 US 
Census data, Boston is one 
of the most segregated 
cities in the US.1 Despite 
the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act, which made it illegal to create 
restrictive covenants discriminating 
against black homeowners buying in 
predominantly white areas,2 Boston 
has neighborhoods such as Mattapan, 
Chinatown and Dorchester that 
remain almost entirely populated by 
a singular race.3
Political scientists measure 
segregation using dissimilarity 
indices, which measure the 
percentage of the minority population 
that would need to move out of their 
neighborhoods to have minorities 
evenly spread across the metropolitan 
area. Boston’s dissimilarity index 
is 0.64, meaning 64% of minorities 
would need to move to completely 
desegregate the city. Boston is in a 
state of de facto hyper-segregation.4
What are the legal causes and 
ramifications of segregation in 
Boston? The answer is complex. 
Segregation in Boston became highly 
institutionalized in the 1930s when 
the Homeowners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) created the concept of 
“redlining.” HOLC gave out affordable 
loans to prospective homebuyers, 
but only those who already lived 
in neighborhoods that were not 
“redlined” or thought to be less likely 
to repay their loans. The redlined 
areas were predominantly inhabited 
by African Americans, which meant 
that African American prospective 
homeowners could not obtain loans 
through HOLC. This redlining also 
occurred in Jewish, Slavic and Eastern 
European neighborhoods of Boston 
but not to the same extent as it did for 
African American neighborhoods.5 
In 1968 the Fair Housing Act 
made HOLC’s policies illegal. 
However, it was still difficult for 
African American families to move 
into predominantly white areas. In 
1988, the NAACP filed a class-action 
lawsuit against the Boston Housing 
Authority (BHA) for “maintaining 
racially segregated public housing 
through site-specific waiting lists”.6 
African American homeowners were 
being systematically discouraged 
from applying to public housing in 
predominantly white areas of the 
city during the 1980s such as South 
Boston, Charlestown and East Boston. 
As a result of the lawsuit, Boston was 
forced to integrate all public housing 
projects.7
African Americans in 
predominantly white areas continue 
to face challenges. As recently as 
2008, Nadine Cohen, an attorney 
and founding board member of 
the Fair Housing Center of Greater 
Boston, said that African American 
and Latino families were targets 
for racial violence. “Many of these 
incidents were harrowing: young 
African American children having 
firecrackers put in their jackets 
while their hands were held behind 
their backs; bricks and bottles being 
thrown through the windows of 
African American and Latino families; 
doors of families of color locked from 
the outside so people couldn’t escape; 
feces thrown on doors; racial graffiti 
and vandalism endemic and constant 
verbal and physical harassment of 
minority tenants.”8 
Cohen argues that the BHA did 
not take appropriate action to 
protect minorities living in these 
hostile environments. The Lawyer’s 
committee brought 13 Jane Doe cases 
to the HUD, or the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. 
This resulted in the BHA creating a 
Civil Rights Protection Plan, which 
outlined response procedures for 
the BHA to follow in cases of racially 
motivated harassment of tenants.9 
The Supreme Court case Texas 
Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities 
1 “2010 Census Shows Boston Among Most Segregated Cities.” 
2010 Census Shows Boston Among Most Segregated Cities Radio 
Boston RSS 20. Accessed October 22, 2015.
2 James, Kent. “Fair Housing Act of 1968.” Encyclopedia of 
American Urban History.
3 Rogers, Abby. “12 Maps That Show The Extreme Racial Segre-
gation In America’s Biggest Cities.” Business Insider. December 
20, 2011. Accessed October 18, 2015.
4 Logan, John R. “The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st 
Century Metropolis.” City & Community: 160-68.
5 Hillier, Amy E. “Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corpo-
ration.” Journal of Urban History, 2003, 394-420.
6 “The Fair Housing Center.” www.bostonfairhousing.org. 
Accessed October 22, 2015.
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
9 Ibid
10 “Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.” SCOTUSblog RSS. Accessed 
November 1, 2015. 
11Ibid.
12 “About BHA.” Boston Housing Authority. Accessed October 
22, 2015.
13 “Boston Redevelopment Authority.” Home | Boston Redevel-
opment Authority. Accessed November 1, 2015. 
Project, Inc., which reached a decision 
in June 2015, ruled that disparate-
impact claims are cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act.10 The lawsuit claims 
that certain public housing could be 
considered illegal discrimination if it 
has a measurable “adverse impact” 
on the people there. The Inclusive 
Communities Project argued that the 
Texas Department of Housing was only 
creating affordable public housing 
in predominantly African American 
neighborhoods, keeping an a more 
impoverished portion of the population 
from leaving these areas.11
This landmark Supreme Court 
case applies to the city of Boston, 
where almost 58,000 residents live 
in subsidized housing provided by 
the Boston Housing Authority.12 Many 
of these public housing projects 
are located in predominantly black 
neighborhoods such as Mattapan, 
which is 81% African American.13
As Boston grows both economically 
and in population, desegregating 
the city remains an important issue. 
Historic and recent Supreme Court 
cases pave the way for a less segregated 
and more racially diverse city, but there 
is still much work to be done in Boston, 
the Cradle of Liberty.
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D
ebates regarding 
government funding of 
Planned Parenthood 
have recently emerged 
in Congress. The 
conservative push to defund Planned 
Parenthood, a top global healthcare 
provider,1 resurfaced when The 
Center for Medical Progress, an 
anti-abortion group that monitors 
medical advancements,2 produced 
heavily edited videos which presented 
Planned Parenthood officials selling 
fetal tissue for scientific research. Later 
discoveries of the full, unedited videos 
showed the executives emphasizing 
that their clinics charged only enough 
to cover the costs of processing, 
preserving, storing, and transporting 
the fetal tissue, and were not earning 
a profit.3 This raises the question of 
whether or not Planned Parenthood’s 
current practice of providing aborted 
fetuses to medical researchers is 
legal. The two issues surrounding this 
debate are the use of aborted fetuses 
for scientific experimentation and the 
monetary compensation associated 
with the transfer of fetal tissue to the 
medical researchers. 
The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade ruled a Texas state 
statute criminalizing abortion 
unconstitutional.4 This decision 
allowed women the right to an 
abortion under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and created a precedent that allowed 
healthcare clinics, such as those 
operated by Planned Parenthood, to 
provide abortions to women.5 
The video, however, discusses 
the use of fetal tissue for scientific 
and medical experimentation, an 
issue that was addressed in the 1990 
U.S. District Court case Lifchez v. 
Hartigan.6 In this lawsuit, Dr. Aaron 
Lifchez challenged a provision of the 
Illinois Abortion Law that prohibited 
fetal experimentation. This provision 
By Sofia Zocca 
CAS ‘18 
stated that “no person shall sell or 
experiment upon a fetus produced 
by the fertilization of a human ovum 
by a human sperm unless such 
experimentation is therapeutic to the 
fetus thereby produced.”7
The U.S. District Court  upheld Dr. 
Lifchez’s objection to the law, ruling 
the provision unconstitutional. The 
Court asserted that the law violated 
the Due Process Clause because 
of its vagueness, failing to define 
“experimentation” and “therapeutic,” 
as well as its invasion of the right to 
privacy.8 This decision struck down the 
provision of the Illinois Abortion Law 
criminalizing fetal experimentation, 
and set a determinate precedent 
allowing human fetal tissue to be 
legally utilized for scientific research. 
The legality of fetal experimentation 
was sustained when Congress passed 
the National Institutes of Health 
Revitalization Act of 1993.9 This law 
permitted experimentation upon fetal 
tissue procured from abortion with 
stipulations requiring the woman’s 
consent. The issue of consent was 
addressed in the video with Planned 
Parenthood official, Dr. Deborah 
Nucatola, in which the executive 
emphasizes the importance of 
consent and ensuring that the women 
are not coerced.10
Another issue that the pro-life 
community, as well as conservative 
members of Congress, has discussed 
is the illegality of selling fetal tissue. 
United States Code Title 42 - The 
Public Health and Welfare, Section 
289g-2 includes “prohibitions 
regarding human fetal tissue.”11 42 
U.S.C. 289g-2 criminalizes the sale, 
purchase, or transfer of human fetal 
tissue for “valuable consideration,” 
which it defines as “not includ[ing] 
reasonable payments associated with 
the transportation, implantation, 
processing, preservation, quality 
control, or storage of human fetal 
tissue.”12 Thus, while it is illegal to 
earn a profit on the sale of fetal tissue, 
receiving monetary compensation 
to cover the costs listed under this 
statute is legal.  
While Planned Parenthood 
participates in the transfer of fetal 
tissue to medical researchers, it 
complies with United States law. As 
Dr. Nucatola specifies, the healthcare 
facility charges $30 to $100 per 
patient in order to cover the costs 
of processing, preserving, storing, 
and transporting the tissue.13 The 
healthcare provider only requests 
payments for services that can legally 
be covered, according to 42 U.S.C. 
289g-2, and that do not constitute 
“valuable consideration,” or earn a 
profit for the organization. Based 
on the testimonies of the Planned 
Parenthood officials in the videos 
and a careful inspection of the 
laws regarding abortion, the use 
of aborted fetal tissue for medical 
experimentation, and financial 
remuneration, we can conclude that 
the actions of Planned Parenthood are 
within the law.  
1 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, “About Us,” 
Planned Parenthood, last modified 2014, accessed Oct. 15, 
2015, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-
we-are/mission.
2 “About Us,” The Center for Medical Progress, last modified 
2015, accessed Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.centerformedical-
progress.org/about-us/.
3 The Center for Medical Progress, Full Footage: Planned 
Parenthood Uses Partial-Birth Abortions to Sell Baby Parts, 
YouTube video, 2:42:22, published July 14, 2015. https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4UjIM9B9KQ.
4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 Ibid.
6 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp., Dist. Court, ND Illinois 
(1990).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 National Institute of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 
accessed Oct. 15, 2015, http://orwh.od.nih.gov/about/pdf/
NIH-Revitalization-Act-1993.pdf.
10 United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 4, Title 42 
- The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 6A – Public Health 
Service, Subchapter III – National Research Institutes, Part 
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By Victoria LeCates
CAS ‘17The sixth amendment establishes the right to an attorney stating, “The accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense.”1 Despite its 
constitutional origins, this fundamental 
right is seemingly undermined by 
the broken public defense system in 
the United States. Public defenders 
are facing excessive caseloads, while 
some accused persons are never 
even provided with a lawyer at all. 
Overworked and underpaid, it is a 
challenge for public defenders to 
properly serve their clients. 
The right to counsel has been tested 
in many different courtrooms over the 
course of our nation’s history. Perhaps 
the most famous ruling on the matter 
was handed down in 1963, when the 
Supreme Court decided on Gideon v. 
Wainwright.2 Gideon, a Florida citizen, 
was accused of breaking into a poolroom. 
He requested a lawyer, but at the time 
indigent defendants (defendants who 
cannot afford to hire a private attorney) 
were only guaranteed counsel in capital 
cases. Forced to represent himself, 
Gideon was sentenced to five years in 
prison.3 After filing a writ of habeas 
corpus that was denied by the Florida 
State Supreme Court, Gideon wrote to 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
from his jail cell. The ensuing case ended 
in the landmark decision that extended 
the sixth amendment right to counsel to 
defendants in state courts.4
Since Gideon, the prison population in 
America has grown from approximately 
217,000 inmates to 2.3 million.5 The 
growing number of cases each year has 
put undue strain on the public defender 
system. 
 National caseload standards set 
the maximum number of cases a full-
time attorney may take per year. For 
felonies, misdemeanors, and juvenile 
cases the maximums are 150, 400, and 
200 cases respectively. According to an 
article published by the National Bar 
Association in 2011, three out of four 
county public defender offices have 
caseloads that exceed these national 
limits.6 The article points to Florida as an 
example, stating that “the annual felony 
caseload of individual public defenders 
increased to 500 felonies per year, while 
the average for misdemeanor cases rose 
to an astonishing 2,225.”7
Not only is this dangerous for the 
public defenders who must resolve 
these cases, it is extremely dangerous for 
those they must represent. According 
to Tanya Greene, an ACLU attorney and 
capital public defender, ninety to ninety-
five percent of public defender cases 
each year end in a guilty pleading.8 The 
pressure to get rid of cases is so high that 
it is oftentimes easier to push clients to 
plead guilty than is to try their case. 
This is exactly what happened to 
Georgia resident Richard Anthony 
Heath in 2000. Heath was in a truck 
that collided head on with a car full of 
teenagers, all of whom were injured. 
He was charged with fifteen counts of 
serious injury by vehicle, two counts of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, 
and one count of reckless driving. Unable 
to afford an attorney, he was assigned to 
public defender Jason Shwiller.9 Heath, 
who had no memory of the accident, 
confided in Shwiller that he believed his 
coworker was driving the truck at the 
time of the collision. Shwiller neglected 
to hire a private investigator to verify 
these claims. In fact, Shwiller never 
requested court funds to hire a private 
investigator in any of his cases as a public 
defender, and never once took a case to 
trial before a jury. Shwiller advised his 
client to plead guilty to three counts of 
serious injury by vehicle and two counts 
of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
He told Heath that he would likely 
receive a sentence on the lower end of 
a four to fifteen year range. Heath was 
sentenced to serve the full fifteen years. 
The resulting court case Health v. State 
ended in a ruling that allowed Heath 
to withdraw his plea.10 The decision 
was reversed by the Supreme Court of 
Georgia in 2003.11 The root of the issue 
seems to be that Shwiller was one of just 
four public defenders in his county. 12
The United States needs more public 
defenders, or at least an increase 
in assigned counsel (attorneys that 
also run a private practice). However, 
underfunding discourages many 
lawyers from representing indigent 
persons. The compensation for assigned 
counsel is often a low hourly wage 
that does not cover all of the overhead 
costs.13 Consequently, the unwillingness 
of private attorneys to become assigned 
counsel in turn causes higher caseloads 
for public defenders. While this situation 
is strenuous for public defenders, it 
is their clients, who otherwise cannot 
afford to hire attorneys, who ultimately 
pay the price.
1 U.S. Const. amend.VI.
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By Yvette Pollack
COM ‘17In the 1990s, Stephen Kimble made Halloween significantly more fun with his patented invention of a Spider-man inspired contraption that would allow the wearer to shoot a foamy string up to 3 feet away.1 Toy Biz, now part of Marvel Enterprises, declined 
to buy the license to use the patent, but made a verbal 
agreement that they would pay Kimble if they produced 
a similar toy.2  Some years after, Marvel launched the 
Web Blaster®, which had many similarities to Kimble’s 
invention, without Kimble’s knowledge or consent.3 
Marvel’s spidey-senses should have warned the company 
of what was to come.
Kimble sued Marvel and won for patent infringement 
and breach of contract in 1997.4  Both parties then appealed 
the decision, and then settled in 2001.5  Kimble and Marvel 
had a brief period of peace, but there was a ticking time 
bomb underneath the settlement agreement. Kimble’s 
patent expired in 2010;6  however, the 2001 settlement 
with Marvel allowed Kimble to receive royalty payments 
even after the patent expiration as there was no written 
clause on when Kimble’s benefits would be terminated.7 
Marvel’s lawyers chose to use the precedent of Brulotte v. 
Thys Co. to immobilize Kimble and his lawyers in a sticky 
web of stare decisis rather than Spider-man’s faux silk.
Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964) decided that a patent owner 
cannot collect royalties for his or her invention once the 
patent has expired per se.8  Under the current patent laws, 
an inventor has exclusive rights to a patented invention 
(typically 20 years).9  After the patent expiration, the 
invention is free for the public to use.10  Because only one 
person or thing has the rights to a single invention for 
a certain amount of time, the invention is thought to be 
under time-limited patent monopoly  and thus anti-trust 
laws apply.11  
Many groups of people that were rooting for Kimble’s 
point that the current law hurts innovation.13  For the same 
reason, Brulotte v. Thys Co. is not well liked amongst those 
in the fields of academics, medicine, and economics.14 
Many economists point out that the per se laws made in Brulotte v. Thys Co. do not make economic sense 
and therefore prefer a “case-by-case” system.15 Justice 
Breyer, however, noted that no economist seems to have 
considered the costs of judicial administration in analysis 
that the case-by-case “rule of reason” would bring.16 
According to the Supreme Court, only Congress, not the 
friendly neighborhood Spider-man, can decide the fate of 
the Brulotte v. Thys Co. precedent.17  
On its own, Kimble v. Marvel did not justify that change 
was needed enough to convince the Supreme Court. This 
might have been because Kimble v. Marvel never should 
have happened. Justice Kagan even mentioned that many 
lawyers know how to get around the narrow scope of 
Brulotte v. Thys Co.18 Marvel’s attorneys should have put 
in a clause about when Kimble would stop receiving 
royalties and made him aware before the agreement. 
Kimble could have received more money upfront as part 
of his pre-expiration payment, had such a clause been 
drafted in.19   Although the law does not allow an inventor 
to receive royalties for patented aspects of the invention 
after the expiration, it is permissible to receive royalties 
for non-patented parts of the invention.20  Other precedent 
allows an inventor to receive royalty payments for sales, 
whenever a part of the invented object is used in a product 
sold.21  The moral of this less-than-action-packed tale is 
that with the “great power” of a law degree, “comes great 
responsibility” to the client.
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